

ABOUT MIGRATION

7 Researches of 5 Ethiopian
Universities on the roots
causes

Emergency Initiative in support of
vulnerable people, refugees,
IDPs and migrants addressing
the root causes of irregular migration



ITALIAN AGENCY
FOR DEVELOPMENT
COOPERATION



The opinions expressed by the interviewed and the researchers do not reflect the view of the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation.

Addis Ababa, April 2017

Table of Contents

Introductions

Giuseppe Mistretta, Ambassador of Italy, Ethiopia.....v	
Ginevra Letizia, Head of Italian Agency for Development Cooperation, Ethiopia.....vii	
Maria Rosaria Notarangeli, Head of Emergency Programme, Ethiopia..... ix	

Overview on drivers, routes and impacts of migration in Ethiopia and the role of development cooperation in fighting roots causes By Andrea Stocchiero, Centro Studi Politica Internazionale - CeSPI.....1	
--	--

Researches' Summaries

Irregular Migration in Eastern Zone of Tigray: Causes, Consequences and Alternative Strategies By Bisrat Weldesilassie, Teklebrhan Berhe, Weldeabrha Niguse and Muuz Abrha (Adigrat University).....33	
---	--

Causes and Consequences of Irregular Migration in Bale Zone, Oromia Regional State, South Eastern Ethiopia By Henok Yohannes, Seid Mekonen, Marcon Bashaye and Birhanu Negeri (Madda Walabu University) - First research By Henok Yohannes, Tizazu Ayalew Teka, Mesfin Abraham and Getachew Demisse (Madda Walabu University) - Second research..... 37	
--	--

Causes and Consequences of Irregular Migration in Tigray, Ethiopia By Kelemework Tafere, Zenawi Gebremeskel, Tsehay Weldegiorgis, Awet Hailezgi and Kelil Demsis (Mekelle University)..... 43	
---	--

Determinants and Dimension of Irregular Migration: the Case of Habro, Darolebu and Mieso Weredas of Oromia National Regional State, Ethiopia By Tekalign Diyana, Muktar Mohammed and Ahmed Mohammed (Oda Bultum University).....47	
---	--

Magnitude, Determinants and Effects of Illegal Out-Migration from South Wollo Zone, with a particular Emphasis on selected Woredas By Kassegne Damtew and Gashaw Mohamed, (Wollo University)..... 51	
--	--

From Ethiopia to Italy: Causes and Complexity of Migration By Adelaide Massimi and Fabrizio Coresi.....57	
--	--

Acknowledgment..... 62	
------------------------	--

Introductions

I am glad to present to you the results of the research on migration carried out in the framework of the first pilot programme “Emergency Initiative in support of vulnerable people, refugees, internally displaced people and migrants addressing the root causes of irregular migration” implemented by the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation.

The results of the seven researches done by five Ethiopian Universities in the 12 months duration of the Programme, which are hereby reported, represent a useful and systematic data collection on migration in Ethiopia that can be definitely used for future interventions in this sector in the Country.

I am confident that these inputs will also contribute positively to all activities and projects on migration in Ethiopia.

Giuseppe Mistretta
Ambassador of Italy to Ethiopia

We live in a “liquid modernity”, borrowing the definition of Bauman, and this liquidity is now global. The movement of people and people seeking an opportunity is part of history. But it is true that this movement is often too risky and imposed more by the need than by free choice.

We have worked on this with the Pilot Programme that has just come to an end: in trying to give a reason for being able to stay, to be able to choose freely between the appropriate and the necessary.

The premise of the action is knowledge, so we have involved the Universities in a constant co-operation entwined with the actions of NGOs on the field.

Having a set of documents that collect and process testimonies, is furthermore an opportunity to leave a legacy of our time. The history, with a small ‘h’, the one lived by most people, is handed down here, ennobled by what is left in writing, but also by the impact the narrative may have on the lives of others. Even on the drafting and progress of an Emergency Programme ... That is why cooperating means bringing together experiences and abilities: intellectually, of life, of action and seeking the value of that liquid modernity that often destabilizes us in its apparent lack of solid support.

The research for us has become the excuse for action itself, and the experience is our research tool.

I leave you reading with this constructive spirit, and with the hope that the following pages will be useful for further actions, evaluations and exchanges.

Ginevra Letizia
Head of Italian Agency for Development Cooperation, Ethiopia

The general objective of the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS) pilot Program Emergency Initiative in support of Vulnerable People, Refugees, IDPs and Migrants has been to address the root causes of irregular migration through four sectors: creation of Income Generating Activities and access to job opportunities, especially directed to young people and women; strengthening the resilience of local communities and fostering the quantitative and the qualitative supply of basic services, aiming at improving the living conditions of the most vulnerable people; development and implementation of information and awareness campaigns and realization of Researches on migration.

The Program has been implemented in 16 Woredas of 3 Regions of the Country: Amhara (Northern Shewa and South Wollo), Oromia (West Hararge and Bale), and in Tigray (Eastern Tigray) and within its framework five projects have been carried out through 8 Italian NGOs, putting in place a participatory methodology in close collaboration with local institutions, local NGOs and local communities.

During its 12 months of length, the Program has mainly benefited women (50%), young people between the ages of 18 and 35 (70%), returnees (30%) and potential migrants for a total of 80.072 direct beneficiaries and 580.000 indirect beneficiaries.

The 6 University researches were pivotal in order to guide the field work: theory and practice developed hand in hand. This is also an experience of international cooperation, due to the collaboration between 5 Ethiopian Universities and an Italian organization, which developed the topic, especially in reference to Diaspora. A legacy will be left, for the benefit of all: from them who are interested in the topic to them who work daily on this topic. A legacy, but also a restitution, a verbal picture, a document of contemporary history, realized by many people, that I want to deeply thank. From them who shared their experiences, precious because unique pieces of lives, to them who were as wise as to collect them. We accurately reported everything that was told. We respected this will of honest restitution. We believe that reality is the basic precondition of our fieldwork. It must be shared without that filters that altered the story and consequently the action.

Also for this, we believe these researches can be a valid working tool for other colleagues in our sector. It is an arrival point, that can turn to be a starting point, as a good cooperation program should basically be, for a shared development.

Finally, besides the Universities, my deeply thanks go to the Italian NGOs: ActionAid, Amref, CCM, CIAI, CIFA, CISP, COOPI e VIS.

Maria Rosaria Notarangeli
Head of Emergency Programme, Ethiopia

Overview

Overview on drivers, routes and impacts of migration in Ethiopia and the role of development cooperation in fighting roots causes

Andrea Stocchiero | Centro Studi Politica Internazionale - CeSPI

Introduction: the political and institutional framework on root causes of migrations

The European Union (EU) launched the **La Valletta Action Plan**¹ on migration and development in November 2015. It set the conditions for the creation of the Trust Fund on irregular migration.² This political decision has been spurred by the migration crisis in Europe more than by considerations on the refugee crisis existing in African and Middle East countries. The majority of national public opinions and governments of EU member states perceive migration as a hot and toxic political issue that requires more containment. The European narrative on migration is biased towards a security approach. On the other hand, more balanced political positions take into account the partnership with countries of origin and transit and the need to respond to the root causes of migration. Development cooperation may have a role in addressing such causes in coherence with migration policies. But this is not an easy task.

Moreover, civil society organisations (CSOs) criticisms had indicated the peril of aid **instrumentalisation** to migration management and control political objectives. Development cooperation has the primary principle to fight poverty and not to manage migration flows. The La Valletta Action Plan has been set up in the middle of the European migration crisis. And it is interpreted as a plan to externalise the control of migrations for security reason. In this sense, official development assistance could be diverted and conditionality could be attached to its implementation. In this framework, the root causes approach could hide a different aim.

The EU La Valletta Plan with the Trust Fund establish **the need for an evidence-based cooperation**. Knowledge shall be produced for orienting intervention and an effective use of public aid with more results in reducing the root causes of migration, sustaining local human development. But, the complexity of the nexus between migration and development cannot be reduced to the simplistic assumption that more local development stems migrations.

Several analysis underline that **more development does not stop migration flows**. On the contrary it fuels more migrations, because it reduces costs and increases resources that families can use to sustain migrations³. In the short time, development cooperation

1 Valletta Summit on Migration, 11-12 November 2015, Action Plan

2 Commission Decision of 20.10.2015 on the establishment of a European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa

3 See the literature resume on the relation between development and migration in Frouws, B., 2015, *A Certain Catalyst: an overview of the (mixed) migration and development debate with special focus on the Horn of Africa region*. Nairobi: The Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS), p. 65; and in Hein de Haas, 2010, *Migration and Devel-*

could contribute to break immobility chains⁴ and to give the chance to move. It's only in the long term, *ceteris paribus*, that the reduction of development differentials between origin and destination territories could diminish the need to migrate. Migration is part of transformation processes. A perfect substitution between human mobility, capital flows and international trade does not exist. These flows are complimentary and interconnected. The root causes approach makes sense in this development perspective, not for immediate migration reduction and control.

In this framework, **the Italian cooperation** addressed the migration and development topic as a priority of action. The Italian government is working in the EU to improve policies aimed at contributing to the African development and to the governance of migration flows. The last Italian presidency of the EU during the second semester in 2014, promoted the adoption of the EU Foreign Affairs Council conclusion on migration and development, according to which: "Maximizing the positive impact of well managed migration on development is an important policy priority for the EU, as demonstrated by its dual policy framework in this area. The nexus between migration and development is one of the thematic priorities of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, which provides the overarching framework for the EU external migration policy, and is also integrated into the EU development policy framework, of which the Agenda for Change is the latest building block" ⁵

In 2016, the Italian government has elaborated the Migration Compact proposal⁶, that has been translated by the European Commission (EC) in the "new Partnership Framework" ⁷ and in the creation of the External Investment Plan⁸.

All these events and processes have brought to **the need for research on the ground** to better identify the role of development cooperation on migration issues. The Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS) has been implementing in 2016-2017 the *Emergency Initiative in support of vulnerable people, refugees, IDPs and migrants addressing the root causes of irregular migration* whose general objective was to contribute to reduce the root causes of irregular migration. Well aware about the importance of having data and information on the migration phenomena, the initiative has given great emphasis to the research on migration and has involved five different Ethiopian Universities in the activity: Adigrat University, Makalle University, Wollo University, Oda Bultum University and Meda Wolabo University. Each University has carried out researches on migration, collecting and analyzing data on his respective area. One more research, has been carried out in Italy, by Italian researchers, interviewing selected members of Ethiopian Diaspora (Box 1).

opment: A Theoretical Perspective , *International Migration Review*, 44(1): 227-264; Michael A. Clemens, 2014, *Does Development reduce Migration?*, IZA, DP No. 8592 October; Oded Stark and David E. Bloom, 1985, *The New Economics of Labor Migration*, *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 75, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1985), pp. 173-178; e J. Edward Taylor, 1999, *The New Economics of Labour Migration and the Role of Remittances in the Migration Process*, IOM, *International Migration* Vol.37 (1).

4 The break of immobility chains responds to the involuntary immobility of people who have aspirations to migrate but fail to leave: Carling Jorgen and Cathrine Talleraas, 2016, *Root Causes and drivers of migration*, Prio paper, p.10.

5 Council conclusions on migration in EU development cooperation. *Foreign Affairs (Development) Council meeting Brussels*, 12 December 2014.

6 [Http://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/immigrazione_0.pdf](http://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/immigrazione_0.pdf)

7 European Commission, *Communication from the Commission on establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration*, Strasbourg, 7.6.2016 COM(2016) 385 final

8 European Commission, *Communication from the Commission on Strengthening European Investments for jobs and growth: Towards a second phase of the European Fund for Strategic Investments and a new European External Investment Plan*, Brussels, 14.9.2016, COM(2016) 581 final

Box 1. Researchers, Studies and Universities funded by AICS

Kassegne Damtew and Gashaw Mohamed, Magnitude, Determinants and Effects of Illegal Out-Migration from South Wollo Zone: the cases of Ambassel, Tehuledere and Worebabo woredas, Wollo University, April 2017

Henok Yohannes, Seid Mekonen, Marcon Bashaye and Birhanu Negeri, a), Baseline Survey on Socio- economic Conditions Returnees and potential Migrants in Bale Zone, Madda Walabu University, April 2017

Henok Yohannes, Tizazu Ayalew Teka, Mesfin Abraham and Getachew Demisse, b), Causes and Consequences of Irregular Migration in Bale Zone, Madda Walabu University, April 2017

Kelemework Tafere, Zenawi Gebremeskel, Tsehay Weldegiorgis, Awet Hailezgi and Kelil Demsis, Causes and Consequences of Irregular Migration in Selected Woredas of Tigray Regional State, Ethiopia, Mekelle University, April 2017

Bisrat Weldesilassie, Teklebrhan Berhe, Weldeabrha Niguse and Muuz Abrha, Irregular Migration in Eastern Zone of Tigray: Causes, Consequences and Alternative Strategies, Adigrat University, April 2017

Tekalign Diyana, Muktar Mohammed, Ahmed Mohammed, Determinants and Dimension of Irregular Migration: the Case of Habro, Darolebu and Mieso woredas of Oromia National Regional State, Oda Bultum University, April 2017

Massimi Adelaide e Fabrizio Coresi, From Ethiopia to Italy: causes and complexity of migration, ActionAid, April 2017

This document resumes and discusses the main findings⁹ of these researches, trying to put forward some reflections and policy recommendations for development cooperation interventions.

The Ethiopian case is of particular importance because this great country is experiencing a strong economic growth and migration trends. The reports of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA) registered 460,000 legal migrants between September 2008 and August 2013 of whom 94% were women domestic workers, 79% travelling to Saudi Arabia, 20% to Kuwait and the rest to Dubai and other countries. A number of 60-70% of Ethiopian migrants were estimated as irregular, either trafficked or smuggled (MoLSA, 2013¹⁰ cited in Kelemework et al., 2017). Later, 1,5 million irregular migrants who left the country between the year 2008 and 2014 has been calculated (MoLSA), and the US Department of State reports confirms that around “200,000 regular labor migrants who travelled in 2012 represent just 30-40% of all Ethiopians migrating to the Gulf States and Middle East, implying that the remaining 60-70% (between 300,000- 350,000) are either trafficked or smuggled with the facilitation of illegal brokers’ (US Department of State, 2013, cited in RMMS, 2014, p. 35¹¹).

9 Great recognition goes to the Ethiopian authors of the 7 researches. Their study efforts and capacities constitute the essential informative base of this paper, whose responsibility pertains to the author.

10 Report of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, MoLSA. 2013

11 Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat [RMMS], 2014, ‘Blinded by Hope: Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices of Ethiopian migrants’. Mixed Migration Research Series. RMMS, 6,1-60

Structural and systemic factors are root causes of migration from Ethiopia, as will be explained in the following chapters. These factors should propel more migration than what is observed. So that de Brauw hurls the following question: “Given the clear returns to either internal or international labor migration, one might ask why migration rates are not actually higher “(de Brauw, 2014)¹². The implication is that migration will increase with the reduction of obstacles and the improvement of resources availability and local conditions.

Ethiopia is at a cross road of several human flows, in a region characterised by climatic and security instabilities. International donors, the EU and the Italian cooperation consider Ethiopia as a priority partner. Its human development and stability are necessary in principle and for geopolitical reasons. The Ethiopian government is implementing a transformational plan¹³ to support economic growth and poverty reduction. This plan has inevitable consequences also on migration flows, internally and externally. In this framework, the 7 studies of the Ethiopian universities have a valuable importance in shedding lights on the nexus between migration and development.

A spotlight on the researches of Ethiopian Universities

The researches have been conducted in rural settings of different Ethiopian Regions. These contexts show similar characteristics: widespread poverty and scarce livelihoods, informal and low income employment, underemployment and unemployment, low agricultural and non-farm productivity, land property fragmentation, problems of accessibility.

The table summarises the main contextual elements and data on interviews conducted in different locations. These locations have been selected according to information of MoLSA local offices, on the importance of migration dynamics.

Table 1. Ethiopian researchers and universities, locations, numbers of interviews and focus groups

Researchers and Universities	Location: Zones, woredas, districts and kebeles	Geo social characteristics	Interviews and Focus Groups (FG)
Kassegne et al. (2017), South Wollo University	22+19+21 kebeles in 3 woredas (Ambassel, Tahuledere and Worebabo) South Wollo Zone in Amhara Region	Difficult agroecological areas, topography and accessibility, low productivity and widespread poverty. The majority of land is used for self-sufficiency, and in some areas cash crop production for export is insignificant. Moreover, the increasing population puts further pressure on the land, making attainment of self-sufficiency more challenging.	172 returnees 154 emigrant families 127 community leaders 12 Focus groups

¹² Alan de Brauw, 2014, *Migration, Youth, and Agricultural Productivity in Ethiopia*, November

¹³ The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, *The Second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II) (2015/16-2019/20)*.

Researchers and Universities	Location: Zones, woredas, districts and kebeles	Geo social characteristics	Interviews and Focus Groups (FG)
Henok et al. (2017), MaddaWalabu University	4 districts in 3 woredas (Sinana, Gassera, Agarfa, Ginir) and one city administration (Robe town) Bale Zone in Oromia Region	Sedentary and rain-fed agriculture, pastoralism, trade and service in urban area. High informal activities with low productivity. Unemployment is raising in urban areas, while under-employment is the norm in rural areas.	Study on causes and consequences: 236 returnees 55 emigrant families, potential and victim migrants 35 community leaders Baseline survey: 150 returnees 109 potential migrants
Tecaligne et al. (2017), Oda Bul-tum University	9 kebeles in 3 woredas (Daro-labu, Mieso and Habro) West Harerghe Zone in Oromia National Regional State	The majority of people are living in rural areas. Over 41% are under severe poverty with a livelihood entirely dependent on rain-fed agriculture and pastoralism. The low-land parts are characterized by a highly degraded and rugged terrain with erratic and unreliable rain fall pattern. The rapid population growth has significantly increased the pressure on arable land determining a disintegrated farming system.	454 interviews to families with out-migrants, returnees and non-migrant
Kelemework et al. (2017), Mekelle Univestiry	Two Tabias in each of 8 woredas: Raya Azebo, Raya Alamata, Ahferom, Weri Leke, Asgede-Tsimbla, Shire Endaselasie, Qafta Humera, and Setit Humera Tigray Regional state	Small holder agriculture, largely rain-fed, is the backbone of rural economies in Tigray. The region is characterized by severe problems of land fragmentation and degradation due to a multitude of factors associated with the ecology and human action.	265 returnees and 78 potential migrants 10 FG

Researchers and Universities	Location: Zones, woredas, districts and kebeles	Geo social characteristics	Interviews and Focus Groups (FG)
Bisrat et al. (2017, Adigrat University)	six kebeles, one in each Woreda: Irob, Gulomekada, Saesie Tsaeda emba, Gantafeshum, Atsbi wenberta, and Wukro kilte awlaelo Eastern zone of Tigray Regional state	Less than regional average farm land size per household head, recurrent draught and low soil fertility accompanied by low level of investment due to the no war no peace situation, are recorded. Increasing non-farm informal jobs.	372 returnees and potential migrants 6 FG
Massimi and Coresi (2017) ActionAid	4 kebeles of two woredas: Ankober and Termaber in North Shewa, Amhara Region. North Shewa zone, Amhara Region Ethiopian Diaspora in Italy: Rome and Como	Rural area, hit by severe drought from 1987 and characterized by serious problem of land fragmentation. Diaspora associations and churches, governmental reception camps, informal settlements and solidarity associations in Rome and Como.	10 Ethiopians emigrated in Italy 7 local stakeholders in Ankober and Tarmaber Woredas 12 Focus groups in Ankober and Tarmaber Woredas

The researches have implemented a **combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies** based on the collection of primary data and information from different stakeholders through household surveys. Around 2,200 semi-structured and structured interviews to returnees, emigrant families, potential migrants, non-migrants and community leaders have been realised. 40 focus group discussions with different and mixed groups of stakeholders have been conducted. The sample of interviews is statistically representative of local populations. A multidisciplinary approach has been adopted, analysing information from diverse and complimentary perspectives. Some Ethiopian Universities have calculated regression analysis in order to identify determinants of irregular migration.

The **research questions** encompassed the following topics: the socio-demographic profile of migrants, drivers, routes and risks of irregular migrations, consequences on families and local communities. The researches corroborate and consolidate the findings of similar studies realised in Ethiopia in recent years and shed lights on new results that open innovative thinking.

Socio-demographic profile of migrants

The studies of the Ethiopian universities confirm¹⁴ that irregular migrants are mainly young,

¹⁴ On the socio-demographic profiles and drivers of Ethiopian emigrants see the following researches: Fransen, S. and Kuschminder, K, 2009, *Migration in Ethiopia: History, Current Trends and Future Prospects*. Paper Series: Migration and Development Country Profiles. Maastricht: Maastricht Graduate School of Governance; Kuschminder, K. and Siegel, M., 2014, *Migration & Development: A World in Motion Ethiopia Country Report*. Maastricht: Maastricht University; RMMS, 2014, *op. cit*; Carter, B., Rohwerder, B, 2016, *Rapid Fragility and migration assessment*, (Rapid Literature Review). Birmingham, UK.

primarily males but with important percentages of female, both married and singles, with low and medium education (primary and secondary education) and skills, pertaining to middle size families (Henok et al., b, 2017), and proportionally linked to religions and ethnical groups existing in the woredas.

The majority of migrants are male but also female migration is important. About one third of irregular migrants are female working as housemaids in families of destination countries, while migrant males work as herdsman and workers in the construction and petty trade sectors, but also in illegal activities (Kassegne and Gashaw, 2017).

Moreover *“data show that urban youth are more vulnerable to irregular migration as they are more exposed to migration related information and influence”* (Kelemework et al., 2017). Other information indicate that also better off persons and families are considering the opportunity to migrate for improving their lives in a short period of time (Bisrat et al., 2017).

A significant difference exists between **male and female migrants**: males travel mostly through irregular channels, while female use relatively more regular ways. Male are more risk taker than female.

“Therefore, the study finding shows sex selective nature of migration dominated by male and with 20 – 29 years of age groups categories of returnee because of irregular passages are full of risks and challenges, so that it looks males are more keen to take risk.” (Henok et al., b, 2017). And the regression calculated in the same study finds that: *“individual level factors such as the migrant’s gender, age, educational achievement and perception of availability of economic opportunities in destination countries are important determinants of travel mode.”* The estimation indicates that *“male are 6 times more likely to travel irregularly than female (...) while females are 3.22 times more likely to travel in regular mode than males. (...) migrants with elementary school qualification and migrants with secondary school qualification are respectively 9.75 times and 5 times more likely to migrate irregularly as compared to college or university graduates after controlling for other factors in the model. This suggests that as the educational qualification of migrants increase from primary to secondary and to college degree, the likelihood of irregular mode of immigration decreases.”* (Henok et al, b, 2017)

Finally, the majority of irregular migrants are sons/ daughters and household heads with low earning capacity, self-employed in agriculture and petty trade (Henok et al. b, 2017).

Magnitude, trends and destination

It’s extremely difficult to estimate the number of irregular migrants because data collected by official services at local level suffer limitations. Ethiopia is one of the countries affected by international migration with an outmigration of 620,100 (i.e. 0.7 per cent of the country’s population) in 2010 (The World Bank, 2011)¹⁵. According to Frauws *“Migration within and from the Horn of Africa region is still relatively low, but is bound to increase in the next decades.*

15 The World Bank Migration and Remittances Fact Book, 2011

Ethiopia in particular may witness rising emigration rates in the next few decades” (Frouws, 2015)¹⁶.

Numbers collected in the Labour and Social Affairs Bureaus at local level indicate an increasing trend in migration in Bale, West Harerghe and South Wollo Zones (Henok et al., b, 2017; Tekalign et al., 2017; Kassegne and Gashaw, 2017). In the case of Tigray Region, the Regional State Bureau of Labor and Social Affairs (2013), estimated that more than 42,000 people migrated from the region both legally and illegally between 2009 and 2012, in a period of four years only (Kelemework et al., 2017). All the researches of Ethiopian universities have collected a general perception of an **increasing number of irregular migrants** towards Arab countries.

In South Wollo, “the information collected from various sources ensured the massive flows of illegal out migrants from year to year. According to focus group discussion, illegal out migration flows from the study areas will continue to increase because of unemployment and poverty. As some individuals suggested, illegal migration is becoming an option for many people in search of employment”. (Kassegne and Gashaw, 2017)

In Tigray, “From focus group discussions and key informants it was learned that despite the attempt of the government and other concerned organizations in curbing the problem, illegal migration is becoming more intense. Especially among the youth, and specifically those who completed grade ten but failed to join universities, illegal migration is considered the major economic lifeline. Even in areas where it was not much known illegal migration has become common, for the youth has now access to the social media where it is exposed to ‘success’ stories of migrants.” (Kelemework et al., 2017)

The increase happens notwithstanding the recent deportation measure imposed by the Saudi Arabia government, the successive migration ban enacted by the Ethiopian government and the protracted crisis and conflict in Yemen.

This trend should be considered in dynamic terms taking into account that the improvement of family earnings allows them to better sustain migration costs. More Ethiopians should be able to afford the costs of migration if the economic situation continues to improve. If Ethiopia reaches the emigration rates of some lower-middle-income countries (between 5 and 10 per cent), between 4.7 and 9.4 million Ethiopians could be on the move within and beyond the region (Frouws 2015 cited in Henok et al., a, 2017)

The researches of the Ethiopian universities indicate that main **destinations** are Arab countries and particularly Saudi Arabia. Europe is a marginal destination in migrant projects¹⁷. Notwithstanding the imperfect and asymmetric information, the migration route appears to be a rational choice that takes into account a balance between costs, risks and

16 “(...) even if the numbers of Ethiopians that are annually migrating to Yemen, the Gulf States, Kenya, Southern Africa, Israel, Sudan, Libya and Europe – both regularly and irregularly – are added up, the total Ethiopian emigrant population will most likely not exceed 1 per cent of the total population of 94 million. This is a relatively low percentage compared to typical emigration (and middle-income countries) like Mexico and Morocco, with emigration rates between 5 and 10 per cent. (...) Any take-off development in Ethiopia is likely to lead to accelerating take-off emigration for the coming decades.” (Frouws, B., 2015, op. cit, p. 58)

17 On the journey to Europe see: Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS), 2014, *Going west contemporary mixed migration trends from the Horn of Africa to Libya and Europe, mixed migration research series explaining people on the move, study 5*, June

possible benefits. Migrants and their families consider more convenient the irregular routes towards neighbour countries rather than to Europe, as commented in the following chapters.

Drivers of migration

The researches of the Ethiopian universities investigate **push, pull and re-in force factors** such as networks of actors promoting and sustaining irregular migrations. Push factors appear to be the main motivations of migration and particularly: unemployment and underemployment, low salaries, scarce land accessibility and fertility, and poverty in general. Economic motivations are the most underlined by respondents, while local governance and political factors are the least reported (Henok et al., b. 2017). In the case of Tigray Regional state the situation is relatively different because of the “no war no peace” situation and of the insufficiency of government policy to sustain local development, as reported forward.

According to the **regression analysis** elaborated in the research of Kassegne and Gashaw (2017) **push factors (unemployment, land scarcity and poverty)** are more significant than pull factors in explaining drivers of migration. The same conclusion is derived from the regression analysis of Henok et al. (b, 2017): *“migrant will choose to irregularly migrate even if he/she perceives that life in the destination country is not easy or is full of challenges as long as he/she believes that life in the home country is much more challenging (...) the drivers of irregular migration in the studied areas are more likely to be of push type or are less likely to be of pull type of factors”*.¹⁸

Simple description of answers from respondents indicate that unemployment, poverty and land scarcity, as push factors, motivate migration (Tekalign et al., 2017). Furthermore, in the probit estimation of determinants of irregular migration calculated by Tekalign et al. (2017) *“Levels of age, education and common property are negatively correlated with irregular migration, while expectation of high income abroad, social networks and membership in local formal and informal institutions (like cooperative, iqub, idir credit and saving), women association and the like are positively correlated with irregular migration”*.

However, even if migrants are aware of the dire labour conditions in destination countries, the fact that better opportunities of employment and salaries exist abroad, make feasible the choice to migrate. In this sense the **differential concept** captures the interconnection between push and pull factors as it is the case with differentials in salaries and employment opportunities between Ethiopia and Arab countries (Frauws, 2015, p.9). The push and pull approach should be overcome by a more systemic overview that put these factors in the same context as proposed by the dual labour market and by the structuralist analysis (De Haas, 2008)¹⁹.

At macro level the interconnection between a rich country as Saudi Arabia and the cheap labour in Ethiopia explains the migration dynamic. Ethiopia functions as a **labour reserve**

18 The same conclusion is indicated in “studies conducted in Ethiopia (Tesfaye, 2007) show that rural outmigration in northern Ethiopia has been a response to “push” factors rather than response to “pull” factors from urban areas” (cited in Henok et al, a, 2017). Tesfaye Getnet (2015) ‘Illegal migration: For how long should it go on?’; and in Katrina Kosec, Hosaena Ghebru, Brian Holtemeyer, Valerie Mueller, Emily Schmidt, *The Effect of Land Inheritance on Youth. Employment and Migration Decisions. Evidence from Rural Ethiopia*, IFPRI Discussion Paper 01594, December 2016, p.22

19 De Haas H., *Migration and Development. A theoretical perspective*, working paper 9, International Migration Institute, 2008

for Arab rich countries (Bisrat et al., 2017). On the other hand, Ethiopian labourers are employed in low skill jobs even if they could aspire to better positions. In Arab countries the labour market is strongly segmented and labour rights of Ethiopian workers are not protected. Several interviewed lament the exploitation and suffering they undergo in the workplace as it will be indicated in a successive paragraph.

Data on the **different salaries** Ethiopian workers earn in the local labour market in comparison with Saudi Arabia, reveal the opportunity to migrate. Henok et al. (a, 2017) indicate that in Bale zone: *“The average value in Birr was found to be 1,078 ETB per month and standard deviation of 1,258.00 for returnees. For potential migrants the average monthly income in birr was found to be 992 ETB and standard deviation of 1,273.00. (...) Interviewed returnee and potential migrants expressed that because of high costs of living in Ethiopia and lower income from their current occupation, they have higher intention to migrate.”*

In West Harerghe the research collected the following data: *“Concerning the economic status of the respondents (family of migrants and returnees) before migration, 64.45% of them have indicated in their response that they have no any income while 18.75% of them have indicated in their response that their average income per month was less than 500 Birr. Regarding the current income of the respondents (family of migrants and returnees) 63.60% of them have indicated that their current average income is less than 1,000 Birr per month and 10.96% of them have shown in their response that their current average income is 1,000 to 10,000 Birr per month, while 19.30% of respondents have no income.”* (Tekalign et al., 2017)

In the case of the Tigray Region: *“...the survey result shows that the average monthly income of returnee emigrants is 1,876 Ethiopian Birr. (...) it is difficult to consider that returnees had good economic condition. (...) Similarly, effort was made to measure the monthly income of potential migrants and the finding shows that the average monthly income is 1,754 ETB (...) the majority of the respondents earn very low amount of income.”* (Kelemework et al., 2017)

On the contrary, even if the migrants were employed in low skill and low wage jobs, their earnings in the destination countries are three or four times higher on average than those in Ethiopia: *“ (...) average monthly income returnees earned at country of destination was 5,890 Ethiopian birr (ETB,) with maximum and minimum 50,000 and 400 respectively.”* (Kelemework et al., 2017)

The higher salaries in destination countries allows the transfer of money to the families. **Remittances** constitute a significant contribution to the well-being of migrant's families as the analysis on the consequences of migration demonstrate in the following chapter.

Moreover, if the low well-being **gap between rural and urban settings** is taken into account (Kosec et al., 2016; Atnafu et al., 2014)²⁰, international migration in neighbour countries stands out as a better opportunity than internal migration. While, in the medium term, if the expenses of remittances are more important in urban areas rather than in rural areas, the spatial gap increases stimulating more internal migration. The assumption is that remittances contribute to urban development and urbanisation of rural population.

20 Kosec et al., 2016, op. cit., p.22; Adamnesh Atnafu, Linda Oucho and Benjamin Zeitlyn, *Poverty, Youth and Rural-Urban Migration in Ethiopia, Migration Out of Poverty research programme consortium, Working Paper 17*, July 2014

In fact, poor **rural conditions** constitute a structural factor in explaining migration. Data and information collected by the researches underline the imbalance between population growth and scarce access to land with low productivity²¹.

In South Wollo: "According to resourceful informants, the average plot of land worked per family in the three woredas is inadequate because of its low productivity. The majority of land is used for self-sufficiency, and in some areas, cash crop production for export is insignificant. Moreover, the increasing population puts further pressure on the land, making attainment of self-sufficiency more challenging. It is claimed that most of the grandsons and granddaughters, who are house holders, do not have plots of land and are dependents of their parents' small size of land. Generally speaking, shortage of cultivable land due to rapid population growth; lack of adequate rainfall and decline of the productivity of the arable farmland are among the peoples' most serious challenges. These environmental hazards create conditions of insufficient resources or income that bring about impoverished life of the local people." (Kassegne and Gashaw, 2017)

In Tigrai "the youth's access to Metesha and arable land is almost blocked. One of the major reasons mentioned was shortage of land that can be made available to the youth. In rural Tigrai, especially in densely populated areas, it was explained that the youth cannot get land for farming. Only vacant land whose owners are died is transferred to the youth on the basis of age of applicants. However, the amount of such land is extremely small. Some of the youth the research team approached complained that the land policy the government follows is against the youth, for it does restrict the redistribution of land in which those landless individuals like the youth could get land. Pertaining to this, for example, one interviewee, aged 25, explains that - you have to wait until someone will die to get land...this is not fair ...we know that there are many people who own disproportionally large volumes of land -" (Kelemework et al., 2017)

Access to credit represents another element of weakness in rural areas. Youth and families have scarce access to financing for improving their livelihoods, notwithstanding government and international cooperation efforts.

"It was reported that there is no adequate credit provided by the government. On top of that, the credit system requires beneficiaries to form groups. And the amount of loan provided is very insufficient which does not exceed 20,000 Birr. Mr. Teklay, 24, explains - How can you engage in a meaningful business with 20,000 birr... it is not feasible. The problem is not only with the amount of money provided...we need working place ... but they [woreda officials] do not give you that. They tell you that you can be profitable by working at home but they make you discouraged because there are no working places available for the youth. By the way you cannot access the credit ...even that 20,000 because you are required to present a guarantor or you need to have a collateral. We hear day in day out that the government is committed to bring tangible change in the lives of the youth. But I could say that more should be done especially from the government side". (Kelemework et al., 2017)

Furthermore, the start-up of new economic activities is really difficult: *"the lack of electricity, paved streets and manufacturing plants do not facilitate the opening of sustainable shops", and "a*

21 This corresponds to the importance of land underlined by several analysis (Kebede M., 1994, Migration And Urbanization In Ethiopia. Published By Institute For Curriculum Development And Research (ICDR), Ministry Of Education (MOE); Kosec et al., 2016; de Brauw, 2014, op. cit; de Brauw, A., and Mueller, V. (2012) 'Do limitations in land rights transferability influence mobility rates in Ethiopia?' Journal of African Economies, 21(4): 548-579; Gebeyehu, Z.H., 2014, 'Rural-Urban Migration in Land and Rural Development Policies in Ethiopia'. Presented for 2014 World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty, World Bank, Washington D.C., March 26-27, 2014.

peasant cannot become a retailer suddenly, only because he gets some money” (Massimi e Coresi, 2017).

The studies in Tigray Region underline the criticism of migrants on the government's efforts to address economic problems. Respondents consider that government supports are minimal also for the reintegration of the returnees. The problems of unemployment and underemployment are exacerbated by **bad governance** on allocation of land, loans and real services²².

Particularly important in failing to arrest the irregular emigration are: *“Gaps and inconsistencies within the legal system create a fertile ground for the spread of irregular migration. Although there are laws against trafficking, there are provisions for bail rights that smugglers make use of as a fertile ground to avert facing justice for their wrongdoings.”* (Kelemework et al, 2017)

Other factors are re-in forcing migration dynamics. A special role have **the networks of actors** who promote and facilitate irregular migration. The researches indicate the presence of a real transnational “system” which comprises not only brokers and traffickers along the journeys but also the same migrants and families, parents and peers, as well as bad governance practices.

Information collected in Tigray Region are particularly harsh in highlighting the wide roots and diffusion of irregular migration practices. A real irregular system is in place and involve directly and indirectly many persons and entities (Kelemework et al, 2017). Families and peers have an important role in the migrant decision, and social influences are nurturing a culture of migration (Henok et al., a, 2017).

The culture of migration is presented as another structural factor constituted by **income inequalities, social pressures and attitudinal factors** spurred by migrants and the society at large. The remittances create differences in the well-being between families pertaining to the same local communities. They function as an incentive to migrate. These economic differences interact with social pressures in pushing young sons and daughters to look for a better job and salary in destination countries.

Local communities are more and more convinced that irregular migration is making the difference. The better well-being reached by families with migrant' members are pushing other families to take the same decision. Imitation in migrant decision is a spreading phenomenon (Bisrat et al., 2017)

“Despite the anti-migration sentiment by returnees and those who have already made their way abroad, the temptation to migrate remains very strong because families of migrants demonstrate better economic position (e.g. better housing and alternative livelihood strategies) in the villages of origin conveying the message that it is still advantageous to migrate despite the challenges.” (Kemelework et al., 2017).

Migrants consider that going abroad offer more opportunities than staying in local

²² On these factors see also African Development Bank Group, Development Center OECD, UNDP, 2015, African Economic Outlook 2015. Regional Development and Spatial Inclusion, OECD Publishing, p.145 and 147, where unequal access to social services and dissatisfaction with public services contribute to migration decisions.

communities. *“the survey result illustrates that 145 (54.7 %) reported that they do not feel that success is possible through hard work in country of origin.”* (Kelemework et al., 2017). Opening small ventures in local villages is not convenient. *“The success rates of such enterprises and their sustainability warrants independent studies but according to informants, significant proportions of those who started up small business had to boycott such ventures in search of other opportunities that provide quick gains against marginal costs. Often in the rural areas the small cafes ran by the youth that are opened with loan money entertain only small number of customers due to the generally small population size in rural villages and the lack of the tradition of taking tea or coffee outside the home environment.”* (Kemelework et al., 2017).

Another factor reinforcing migration patterns are **past experiences** that have created knowledge, practices and migrant chains. *“It is worth noting here that Tabias with an increasing trend of migration are composed of Tigrigna speaking communities that stayed in Sudan as refugees following the droughts and series of warfare and conflicts in northern Ethiopia during the Derg regime and were later resettled. Some others have moved there from other areas of the Tigray Region during the voluntary resettlement programmes undertaken by the incumbent government in response to food insecurity and vulnerability to recurrent drought in the highly degraded localities of central, eastern and southern zones. Hence, the mobility experience has long been the hallmarks of such communities making them better prepared to the risks and challenges associated with international migration.”* (Kelemework et al., 2017)

Political decisions and unsecure conditions constitute a specific factor influencing migration. The *“no peace no war”* situation in the Ethiopian-Eritrea border areas creates uncertain and insecurity conditions that do not allow the construction of local human development perspectives. In the case of the Eastern zone of Tigray, foreign and domestic investments are hampered by this situation. Security problems inhibit economic perspectives and youth looks for better opportunities in other places.

“There is significant youths fleeing to other woredas to serve as waiters and open small coffee houses in relatively distant woredas. To this end the no war no peace scenario is exerting its own negative effect in accelerating irregular and internal migration.” (Bisrat et al, 2017)

This situation overlaps with **the dynamic of Eritrean refugees**. Four refugee camps are located in Tigray, and secondary movements are very common inside the country and towards external destinations. The story and experiences of refugees have influenced the behaviour of Ethiopians living in the same areas: *“According to informants, initially, locals were involved in transporting and trafficking Eritrean refugees to countries like Sudan. But gradually, local people themselves got involved in the migration course itself and the mobility experiences spread to areas where people had remained sedentary throughout their lifetime. Many informants claim that the trafficking of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia has set a bad example for the local population and expressed their worries and concerns that the problem of irregular migration might be complicated in the foreseeable future if the Eritrean Refugee crisis persists unabated. Loose control and porous international borders creates heavy influx of people from across the country”* (Kelemework et al., 2017)

Finally, even if the event is not related to the study areas in Nord Shewa, the research of Massimi and Coresi (2017) emphasises that political decisions and economic interests for exploiting natural resources cause forced **relocation of population**. This was the case of the great Gilgel Gibe dam building. This great investment expelled 10 thousand people

from the interested area²³. New infrastructural operations have inevitably impacts on local communities which are compelled to relocate.

Other investments for the exploitation of natural resources generate relocations. The water canalisation from the lake Turkana for irrigation plants and large scale agricultural production of sugar cane, caused the land expropriation of eight indigenous people in the Low Omo Valley²⁴.

Regular and irregular routes, networks and actors of smuggling and trafficking

Routes of migrants may be differentiated according to their **regular, irregular or interwoven modalities**. Regular routes foresee the compilation of all necessary documentation, the concession of visa. Regular emigration travel occurs mainly by air. Main actors are official services and legal private brokers situated in the countries of origin and destination. Notwithstanding the bureaucracy, the request of passports is increasing in South Wollo (Kassegne and Gashaw, 2017) as well as in other Ethiopian Regions.

The irregular routes do not need bureaucracy for documentation and concessions of visa, and are supported by informal actors who constitute an unofficial transnational system. Travels are mainly by roads and sea crossing. An interwoven modality is practiced at the beginning via regular way with the concession of tourist visas that, after their expiration, transform migrants in irregular stayers in the destination country. The request of tourist visa is increasing too (Kassegne and Gashaw, 2017).

As already underlined, the majority of migrants travel via **irregular ways** with the support of illegal brokers, across the sea, towards Arab countries. Migrants travel through different irregular routes according to places of origins and destinations. Important hubs exist that concentrate the passage of migrants.

From Sout Wollo area: *“According to experienced irregular out travelers, routes and hubs for crossing the border to Saudi Arabia include Dessie- Kombolcha – Besheftu--Hayo – Djibouti - Jeza (Yemen) to Saudi border. The other is Addis Ababa-Harar-Jijiga-Besseso (Somalia) - Yemen- Saudi border to different towns of Saudi Arabia in general and Jeddah in particular. The third optional way is Addis Ababa-Adama-Deshitu- Hayu (Djibouti) to the coast of Yemen by boat. After reaching the coast, they would be taken to a “fenced but unofficial and hidden concentration camp” of Yemeni brokers. This is followed by a tiresome journey on foot to the border of Saudi Arabia. The duration of the journey is from a minimum of 18 to the maximum of 90 days.”* (Kassegne and Gashaw, 2017).

In the case of the Bale zone: *“the returnee and potential migrant has used and using two very similar smuggling network: through Afar to Bossaso, Puntland, into Yemen (and from there potentially further on to Saudi Arabia), or from Afar to Djibouti, into Yemen and from there potentially further*

23 Campagna per la riforma della Banca mondiale, 2008. http://assets.survivalinternational.org/documents/76/L_Affare_Gilgel_Gibe_CRBM_It_2.pdf

24 International Rivers, Ethiopia's Gibe III Dam. Sowing hunger and conflicts, 2011, <https://www.international-rivers.org/sites/default/files/attached-files/gibe3factsheet2011.pdf>; S. Avery, What future for the Lake Turkana?, African Study Centre, Oxford, 2013, <http://www.africanstudies.ox.ac.uk/sites/sias/files/documents/WhatFutureLakeTurkana-%20update.pdf>

on to Saudi Arabia. In addition to the secondary data analysis, the experts of irregular migration at Bale Zone Labor and Social Affairs (BZLSA) office added that still there is potential and current migration trail to Arab countries using this illegal smuggling route. The other route and destination including the current migrant and potential migrant are using the following smuggling network: “Starting from Bale migrants will then move along Arsi up to Addis Ababa, from which they are moving in the direction Metema in Amhara Region. Once in Metema these people go beyond the border with Sudan and then continue the journey towards Libya and finally Europe.” (Henok et al., a, 2017).

In Tigray “The journey to Europe via Libya is so expensive (over ten times the amount needed to go to the Gulf region) and hence most low-profile migrants choose to travel to Mekelle-Woldiya/Dessie-Addis Ababa-Jigjiga-Hartshek and Somalia proper from where they can make a transit journey to Yemen and ultimately to Saudi-Arabia. Although the most common routes are the ones highlighted above, it should also be noted that a good number of migrants may stay in Sudan either as a way of saving scarce financial resources, or minimizing the risk of losing one own life during the journey.” (Kelemework et al., 2017)

The researches portrait the economic and socio-cultural construction of a transnational irregular migration system. This system is composed by different **actors** who establish **networks** of informal services and resources dedicated to the smuggling and trafficking of migrants. Parents and relatives, peers and friends, brokers, smugglers and traffickers, government officials and society in general, all have a role in promoting migration. Brokers and smugglers are commonly indicated as the main actors but migrants themselves and their peers assume an increasing role.

“These days migrants and potential migrants are becoming major actors in irregular migration. There are various incentives why the youth engage in such illegal acts. Among others, if a youth brings five or more people as per the agreement with broker, he/she has the advantage to go for free without cash payment to the brokers. Therefore, it is a kind of doing business to bring potential candidates for irregular migration to the hands of the brokers. By this mechanism, traffickers are widening, their networks and penetrations deep into the society. In the study area, respondents confirmed that nowadays, it is difficult to identify who is acting as broker in irregular migration because almost in every household there are youths who are potential migrants or returnees that can do the brokering activities” (Bisrat et al., 2017).

Risks and costs of irregular migration

The researches of the Ethiopian universities have collected many information on the migrant exposure and vulnerability to **risks** during the journey from origin to destination places. Irregular migration may be extremely unsafe causing high human costs²⁵. Along the journey, young men and women could be exposed to high risks, from loss of life to injuries, tortures and kidnapping, to sexual and financial exploitations, grabbing of money and properties, hunger and water thirst, psychological costs due to family separation. More than half of the respondents, in particular returnees, strongly agree with their exposure to

25 On human costs of irregular migrations as well as on drivers and decisions see also Frouws, B., 2014, *Blinded by Hope: Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices of Ethiopian migrants*. Nairobi: The Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS).

these risks (Kassegne and Gashaw, 2017). 70% of returnees from the woredas of the Bale zone have encountered problems (Henok et al., b, 2017). Similar data have been collected also in the other areas.

The exploitation could continue also **in the destination country**, after the journey, in terms of physical and psychological violence, absence of right to change employer, unbearable workload, plundering of properties. According to Henok et al. (b, 2017) many peoples take advantage of migrants, from brokers to employers recruiting irregular workers.

The final risk is **arrest and deportation** as happened in Saudi Arabia in 2013-2014 (Kassegne and Gashaw, 2017). Deportation was a harsh experience for migrants: they were unable to collect their property, they were confiscated and suffered stigmatization. The returnees had few reintegration support and many of them turned to be a financial burden and economic dependent on relatives and friends. This situation push them to consider again the need to re-migrate. (Kelemework et al., 2017).

The cost of irregular migration comprises also economic and financial elements. The **economic cost** may vary mainly between 20,000 to 55,000 Birr, paying the majority to Yemeni and Saudi brokers (Kassegne and Gashaw, 2017). The **financial cost** depends by the source of money, that is composed mainly by usury, informal loans and selling properties (Kassegne and Gashaw, 2017), by gifts from relatives abroad, sale of assets, and saving, loans from relatives and friends (Henok et al., a, 2017). These sources expose families to exploitations and migrants to the moral and material obligation to refund with remittances. It creates heavy burdens on migrants that may be supported only with the success of the their migration project.

The choice for irregular ways depends by the **barriers to regular migration**. Henok et al (b, 2017) find that returnees choose irregular routes because of their cheapness compared to regular routes, the inaccessibility of regular routes, their lengthy and costly bureaucracy, and finally for the persuasion of brokers. Similar perceptions have been collected by the other researches. *“Regular ways cost around 70-80 thousand Birr, while the irregular between 3 and 5 thousand Birr (towards the Gulf). The cost depends also by the number of migrants travelling together”* (from an interview collected by Massimi and Coresi, 2017)

Finally, migrants have information and are **aware of the risk** they could face along the irregular channels. *“But it is often assumed that migrants, while aware of all these risks, downplay the chance it might actually happen to them.”* (Henok et al, a, 2017). *“ (...) the social costs and imminent dangers to human lives are not properly accounted for; and as a result many potential migrants overlook the challenges they might face along the way to the promised lands”* (Kemelework et al, 2017).

According to the analysis conducted in Ankober and Tarmaber woredas, migrant women are aware of the risks and abuses they could suffer. A local respondent said: *“they know what they risk, but they migrate not only for them but for their families, because they are poor and relatives do not own nothing. They risk their life for the families”* (Massimi e Coresi, 2017). Local authorities have Committees implementing awareness raising activities but *“all the people know the risks”* and many persons consider irregular migration as the unique opportunity for improving their livelihoods (Massimi e Coresi, 2017).

Families are aware that staying in local villages does not offer possibilities to improve livelihoods *“(...) some returnees said they knew about the consequences but wanted to try their fate*

as they did not want to see their families suffer before their eyes. The choice for them was between a definitive state of gnawing poverty and an uncertain future after migration with a possibility of success. So, they usually choose the latter because they thought there was light at the end of the tunnel. One of our informants explained using a popular Tigrigna proverb: “Tekormika Mot asafihka Mot” (death strikes in sitting or standing; it does not matter whether you die while standing or while still remaining seated).” (Kelemework et al., 2017)

An informant said: “(...) save all the challenges that irregular migrants face including death, migration is best option to improve one’s livelihood as to me in the current reality of our local condition. Definitely, I will migrate soon and let me see my chance again.” (Bisrat et al., 2017)

Impacts

The researches of the Ethiopian universities coincide on the analysis that **migration improves the family’s standard of life²⁶, but they underline the scarce sustainability of this effect**. As far as migrants send remittances, their families and left behinds increase their livelihoods, creating a dependence linkage. If the migration experience ends, families return to suffer human insecurity. And the returnees consider the possibility to re-emigrate.

“According to the survey data presented, the overwhelming majority (52.67 %) of surveyed returnees reported that if the current situations related to livelihoods remain unchanged and if situations allow them, they are very much eager to leave Ethiopia and move abroad, particularly to Arab countries. On the other hand, 8.00 % of surveyed respondents reported that they had not yet decided to leave Ethiopia or not. Both surveyed groups (returnees and potential migrants) that were eager and ambitious to leave Ethiopia expressed that rising cost of living, housing problem, inadequate supply of consumer goods and inadequate social services like recreational centers, lack of supports either from government or NGOs for livelihood improvement were their compelling reasons or main driving push factors to migrate” (Henok et al., a, 2017)

As a consequence, the question is how to make migration more efficient for a sustainable family’s and local human development.

Financial remittances constitute an important mean for improving the family’s livelihood. At macrolevel remittances to Ethiopia increased sharply from \$1.5 billion in 2014 to \$2 billion in 2015, and \$3.7 billion in 2016 (EBC, January 3, 2016²⁷, mentioned in Kassegne and

26 On remittances effect on family well-being see: Lisa Andersson, 2014, *Migration, remittances and household welfare in Ethiopia* UNU-MERIT Working Papers, Maastricht Economic and social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology, UNU-MERIT Maastricht Graduate School of Governance MGSOG; Alan de Brauw, Valerie Mueller, and Tasew Woldehanna, 2013, *Does Internal Migration Improve Overall Well-Being in Ethiopia?* ESSP working paper 55, June.

27 <http://www.ebc.et/web/ennews/-/ethiopia-remittances-from-abroad-jump-by-2-billion>

Gashaw, 2017)²⁸. Data collected in the researches conducted by the Ethiopian universities confirm the importance of these private financial flows.

In the woredas of the Bale zone “the remittances sent by the returnee migrants while they stay abroad accounted 700, 200,000 and 21,852.28 ETB as minimum, maximum and average value, respectively, per year (...) the number of respondents who owned properties after their return has significantly increased compared to the respondents who own the same types of properties before their migration. This implies that migrants after return has able to change their livelihood at least in fulfilling some of their basic properties regardless of the risks they encountered.” (Henok et al., b, 2017).

In the case of Tigray, “... average monthly remittance was 4,454 ETB and minimum and maximum 1,000 and 75,000 respectively.” (Kelemewotk et al., 2017)

As already indicated, remittances increase at least threefold the income of families. They **use remittances** mainly for household consumption, house building and improvement, while a lesser percentage is dedicated to saving and investment.

“There are emigrant families who have constructed quality houses made up of corrugated iron sheet and cement materials, families who bought oxen and other domestic animals, families who fulfilled their house furniture, families who earned money regularly from abroad and deposited in the bank, opening shops and cafeterias, families who have bought vehicles and the like, families who strongly furnish their school children, and families who live a better and standardized life than before. To the contrary, others said that most of emigrant families found themselves in a precarious situation due to emigrants’ problem of: paying the money borrowed from usurers, getting an adequate salary for compensating the sold properties for paying the journey, releasing the rented land and deportation of their emigrants before working to get the required money in the host countries. In connection to this, participants of the discussion replied that most of the emigrant families are highly bankrupted and now in poverty.” (Kassegne and Gashaw, 2017)

According to the data collected by Henok et al. (b, 2017) in the Bale zone, returnees and migrant families buy in order of importance cattle, houses, furniture and appliances, arable land and pieces of land in cities. **Their preferred businesses** are “Small Scale Enterprise based Cafeteria and Restaurant Service, followed by poultry farming and investing in modern agriculture that is supported by machinery as preferred most by 20.85 % and 16.60 % respondents, respectively. Moreover, business in modern hair dressing (both for male & female), internet café service, fattening and horticulture were found to be other activities preferred by respondents if they get any support facilities” (Henok et al, a, 2017).

28 “The figures (...) are likely to be an underestimation of the total remittances flows, as many transfers, especially South-South transfers are made through informal channels. For example, while the World Bank estimates official remittances to Ethiopia to be only USD 646 million, in another World Bank publication in 2011, the actual volume of remittances in Ethiopia, including flows through formal and informal channels, was estimated to be in the range of USD 1 billion to 2 billion annually.³⁹² A 2015 African Economic Outlook even estimates that remittances to Ethiopia are reaching USD 3 billion annually”. (Frauws, 2015, p.86.). “The result of our analysis shows that the volume of remittance in Ethiopia could be between US \$ 2 to 4 billion per year (an average of about US\$ 3 billion). This is about the size of Ethiopia’s total export and development aid combined” (Alemayehu Geda, Kibrom Tafere, Melekt Amedu, Remittance and Remittance Service Providers in Ethiopia, Institute of African Economic Studies, IAES Working Paper Serious NO. A02/2011.

In Tigray “Money sent from abroad results in better access to food, improved housing, education, health and other services. Although not many, some may also use the money for asset building and small scale investments which serves as a driving force for others to follow and become part of the cycle of irregular migration” (Kelemework et al., 2017)

Stakeholders in focus groups discussed about the migrant **family capacity to plan a better use of remittances**. Some indicated their ability to improve living conditions, other contested their lack of awareness in using efficiently the resources (Kassegne and Gashaw, 2017)²⁹. On the other hand, irregular migration and instable conditions in destination countries reduce the possibility for migrants and their family to plan investments. “Inaccessibility to regular channels prevents to plan structured migration projects and reduces the development impact of remittances” (Massimi and Coresi, 2017). Deportation from Saudi Arabia suddenly interrupted the migrant’s capacity to save. They lost assets and were abruptly repatriated.

The enhancing of migrant’s resources needs regular conditions and **an enabling environment both in destination and origin countries**. Migrant’s capacity in planning family’s life is limited and with little stable perspectives because local contexts do not offer transformative opportunities.

Household consumption comprises also expenses that are really important for improving the **human capital**. It could be conceived as an investment in human capital through better education and health for children. On the other hand, social analysis on migration³⁰ indicate the problem of the **care drain**: minors left behind suffer the lack of emotional care by their mothers migrated to sustain foreign families.

In South Wollo half of respondents (both returnees and community leaders) affirm that children do not get enough guardianship. But also children born in Arab countries and returned in Ethiopia suffer social marginalisation. “Children born in the Arab world are called “*yeareb ager diqaloch*” (illegitimates, or bastards of Arab countries) and are socially segregated.” (Kassegne and Gashaw, 2017).

A correlated effect that could jeopardize family care is the **separation** and divorce between migrants and their spouses. Important percentages of returnees, family respondents and community leaders agree on the perception that migration is conducive to divorce after going and return back to families (Kassegne and Gashaw, 2017). This effect has been emphasized also in the research carried out in Tigray.

“It was also reported that migrations often resulted in the disintegration of family ties, divorce, and deterioration of parents’ health conditions following anxieties and worries emanating from not knowing/not having enough information on the fate of a migrating kin.” (Kelemework et al., 2017).

29 According to a study edited by Bariagaber “remittances sent home have been used wisely for investment and household consumption in Ethiopia and return migrants have acquired many skills” (Bariagaber, A. (ed.), 2014, *International Migration and Development in Eastern and Southern Africa. Ethiopia: Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA)*, quoted in Frouws, 2015, op. cit)

30 See for example: <https://www.theglobalist.com/beyond-the-global-brain-drain-the-global-care-drain/>

An important effect underlined by the researches of Ethiopian universities is **the dropout of students**. The majority of respondents emphasises that several students decide to dropout school after they scored least results and because they are discouraged in continuing their education for the scarce local employment opportunities and for the social pressure of peers.

“The other problem connected with the increasing rate of student dropout is that emigrant family learners pay little attention to the lesson. As the respondents agreed, emigrant family learners are careless about the lesson, had the habit of absenteeism, and lacked family control. Respondents, group discussion participants and informants argument, is related with the intention of the learners to go to the Arab countries, and the deceptive as well as superficial endowments of emigrants, which include financial support and beautification gifts such as cloths mobiles, watches and glittering ornaments. The repliers added that even most of the concerned learners became vagabonds, chat eaters, smokers, drunks and careless about learning due to the money they obtained from emigrant families.” (Kassegne and Gashaw, 2017).

Also, the research in the Eastern Tigray zone underlines the negative effects: *“irregular migration is significantly undermining youth stay in schooling and increasing students dropout rates even terminating university level with increased migrating mentality.”* (Bisrat et al., 2107). An adolescent boy sustains the choice of migrating; *“There are many youths holding diploma and degree from different higher institutions but still unemployed for years. I don’t want to be one of them so; I should found other alternative on time that can change my life”* (quoted in Bisrat et al., 2017)

Other **social and cultural consequences** of migration involve religion and life styles. Some Christians migrated in Arab countries and converted into Islam, influencing the behaviour of their families once back. The Arab way of life (dressing, drug, language) is hybridized in local communities (Kassegne and Gashaw, 2017). The perceptions are mixed: community’s leaders are more worried than returnees and families about these influences.

Community leaders have a strong negative perception on migrants’ effect on local societies and point out four major consequences: State is losing its productive force; national image deteriorates; public legitimacy is undermined; political distrust increases; and failure to be abided by law diffuses (Bisrat et al., 2017).

As already indicated, migration has the effect of **increasing social and economic inequalities** between families with and those without migrants abroad.

“Economic inequality is both a cause and a result of irregular migration. Irregular migration affects the balance of livelihood and purchasing power among local residents. This in turn exacerbates the need for irregular migration” (Bisrat et al., 2017)

This dynamic has two effects. On one hand, inequalities incentive families to choose for migration. It creates a social culture and pressure towards migration as a concrete response to local poor living conditions. The successful migrants demonstrate the rightness of the migration choice. Individual and family life is really changing thank to migration. On the other hand, it risks to dry out loyalty in local community development, increases the mistrust on local governments and reduces civic engagement, deepening the dependence from

external resources³¹. Once again, the question is how to create a linkage between migration and local development, integrating external and internal resources for local development.

The studies of the Ethiopian universities indicate the making of a **vicious cycle of migration**. The migration system is improving the well-being of Ethiopian families but on dependence linkages and perpetuating and expanding the need to migrate. The impact on local development is low (Kosec et al., 2016, p.7). The migrant's resources are invested in human capital and **micro and small productive investment**. But these economic activities produce low added value: shops, cafeterias, small transport services (Kassegne and Gashaw, 2017, and Kemelework et al, 2017), and have minimal impacts at community level (Bisrat et al., 2017). These investments have not an important and durable economic impact.

Some information specifies that migrants prefer to implement **small investments in urban settings**, where market opportunities are better than in rural areas.

"The overall contribution of migration, remittances, remittance-induced business and returnees to the study area were however, by far diminished as the most of remittance-induced investments and returnees remain in urban centers than going back to rural area" (Bisrat et al., 2017)

This dynamic could have a cumulative effect on urban growth, contributing to agglomeration economies and spurring new migration from rural environments. However, migrants are not able per se of transforming local contexts. Their agency should be complemented and integrated in local development strategies conducted by private and public actors.

Main issues on migration and development

The researches of the Ethiopian universities underline the existence of **structural factors** and processes that motivate and support migrations. Migration should be conceived as a structural factor that cannot be stopped in the short time. As already underlined, it seems that the right question is: why migration is not raising in Ethiopia? (de Brauw, 2014). In reality data show that migration is increasing and a transnational irregular migration system is working more and more.

The imbalances between population growth and availability of fertile lands with infrastructures and credit to sustain peasant agricultural productivity, are pushing rural people to look for jobs in urban areas and towards neighbour countries where the labour

31 Ellerman uses the Hirschman concepts of loyalty, voice and exit to categorize migration as an exit choice that reduces the commitment for local development (Ellerman D., 2003, Policy Research on Migration and Development, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3117, August 2003). "If jobs are not available in the home country, then some static efficiency is achieved, and some pressure is released, through the safety valve of migration or gastarbeiter arrangements. But then this may be dynamically inefficient by taking the pressure off of making the domestic reforms necessary for business development that would create jobs at home." (p. 7) "(...) Every potential migrant faces a similar situation: to make a commitment to staying home and trying to better it, or to take its characteristics as given and search elsewhere for a new and better home. Commit to making home better, or exit to find a better home. Economic models of migrant behaviour tend to model only the exit option and ignore the other possible logic of commitment with its inherent uncertainties about the possibilities of transformation." (p.40) "(...) The logic of commitment and transformation which embodies a group-focused or collective-action vision of success has an equal claim as a strategy for social improvement. Moreover, to the extent that the underlying mechanism for the north-south interaction is the dynamics of divergence, then the logic of exit to obtain individual success will work to perpetuate and aggravate the North-South Divide". (p.43)

market is demanding cheap workers. But also, urban areas are in crisis. The 2015 Africa Economic Outlook underlines that **spatial inequities fuel inefficient migration** and urban poverty: *“African cities have not sufficiently acted as a driver of structural transformation. The creation of formal employment did not keep pace with migration flows and most rural-urban migrants found jobs in the informal urban sector”* (ADB-OECD-UNDP, 2015, p.41³²). Previous policies were not able to create jobs in urban settings while the need for labour intensive manufacturing was mounting.

As a consequence, international agencies as well as the Ethiopian government are promoting a structural transformation. It is of critical importance to **ensure balanced investment in urban and rural settlements**, promote linkages and eliminate urban or rural biases. *“Africa’s Agenda 2063³³ aims to **accelerate economic and social transformation** from natural resource-based economies with most of the population employed in agriculture to more diversified economies. Labour will move from low productive sectors, such as agriculture and the informal sector, towards more productive sectors, such as industry and services. This economic transformation will be accompanied by a social transformation with **migration from rural to urban areas** expected to result in a decline in birth and dependency rates”* (ADB-OECD-UNDP, 2016, p. 103)³⁴.

Cities and intermediate settlements play a central role in the objectives of Agenda 2063. African countries are experiencing different dynamics on urban and rural transformations with different implications for migration flows. ADB-OECD-UNDP (2016) identify eight countries as **late urbanisers** that are predominantly rural and yet have begun their urbanisation and fertility transition and structural transformation more recently. They are located in East Africa and include Ethiopia. According to these multilateral institutions *“These are the main challenges for the late urbanisers: continue to improve their infrastructures, particularly transportation linking different urban growth centres, break into manufacturing and higher value services as they continue to move out of agriculture, urbanise, and accelerate their demographic transition. Developing a network of intermediary cities can support the rapid urbanisation that is currently taking place”*. (ADB-OECD-UNDP, 2016, pages 157 and 158)

Diffused local growth is the second driver of urbanisation spurring local migration dynamics between urban and rural areas. *“Long-standing, large villages become rural centres and then small towns, based on their commercial, administrative or religious functions. This has happened particularly in East and West Africa where the number of towns of less than 50,000 people has grown enormously since the 1960s. In addition, improvements in infrastructure and in mobile telephony have contributed to blurring the rural-urban divide: new, short migration patterns appear – with monthly, weekly or even daily commuting – reflecting regional densities and the quality of transportation”* (ADB-OECD-UNDP, 2015, p. 207). In this framework, *“**moving to intermediary cities** may entail lower migration costs than moving to more distant large cities. They offer more possibilities for circular migration and commuting for off-farm employment. Generating rural off-farm employment can reduce rural poverty by providing additional income*

32 African Development Bank Group, Development Center OECD, UNDP, 2015, African Economic Outlook 2015. Regional Development and Spatial Inclusion, OECD Publishing.

33 AfricaUnion Commission (2015), Agenda 2063. The Africa We Want. Final edition, April 2015.

34 Timmer, P. et al. (2012), “Patterns of growth and structural transformation in Africa: Trends and lessons for future development strategies”, WCAO Thematic Research Note, International Food, Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC; African Development Bank Group, Development Center OECD, UNDP, 2016, African Economic Outlook 2016. Sustainable Cities and Structural Transformation, OECD Publishing

(Owusu, Abdulai and Abdul-Rahman, 2011³⁵, and ADB-OECD-UNDP, 2015, p. 172). It can also alleviate credit and liquidity constraints, enabling farmers to preserve their productive assets, generate stocks and stabilise their consumption (Barrett, Reardon and Webb, 2001³⁶, and ADB-OECD-UNDP, 2015, p. 210).

Structural transformation is a medium-long term process that foresees “(...) investments in the service and manufacturing sectors, will be crucial to absorb the fraction of youth with limited opportunities for landownership. The government has signalled its commitment to the latter under its Five-Year Growth and Transformation Plan (2015/2016–2019/2020)” (Schmidt and Bekele, 2016). The job creation in manufacturing in urban areas should go hand in hand with the modernization of the agricultural sector, by increasing access to extension and encouraging widespread adoption of agricultural technologies. Agricultural growth will increase rural household welfare, generating the demand for auxiliary services and goods, which landless rural youth can provide. (Kosec et al, 2016, p. 22)

International and government transformation plans induce migration flows from rural to rural and urban areas. Internal migrations are not estimated but information underline the importance of these flows. “(...) it is evident from existing studies that approximately 50 to 70 percent of the population migrates temporarily or permanently (Mberu, 2006,³⁷ quoted in Henok et al., b, 2017).”

“Farmers from rural areas of South Wollo move to Afar for cotton harvesting, to Southern Ethiopia for coffee production, to different areas for harvesting and to towns for temporary work.” (Kassegne and Gashaw, 2017).

Probably, these flows will increase with the implementation of transformative plans. The measures aimed at attracting investment in industrial zones, as well as in agricultural area for commodity production, create new job opportunities for urban and rural people³⁸. **The assumption of this transformative approach is that these investments should create local jobs with internal migrations that reduce irregular international migration.**

But **different velocities** between faster migration flows and slower local transformations do not stem irregular international flows. Big investments diffused in many territories in short time are needed to create alternatives to international migration and this is not an easy task. On the other hand, the transnational irregular migration system is functioning now and it offers real chances of improving household well-being, even if with high human costs. The system is creating a vicious cycle of migration spurring more migration. It's a cumulative process that can be slowed down with a diffused local structural transformation that needs time to be implemented.

35 Owusu, V., A. Abdulai and S. Abdul-Rahman (2011), “Non-farm work and food security among farm households in Northern Ghana”, *Food Policy*, 36/2, Elsevier, pp. 108-118.

36 Barrett, C., T. Reardon and P. Webb (2001), “Nonfarm income diversification and household livelihood strategies in rural Africa: Concepts, dynamics, and policy implications”, *Food Policy*, Vol. 26/4, Elsevier, pp. 315-331.

37 Mberu, B.U. (2006). *Internal migration and household living conditions in Ethiopia*. *Demographic Research*, 14(21), 509-540

38 See Ethiopian Investment Commission promotion of industrial parks: <http://www.investethiopia.gov.et/investment-opportunities/strategic-sectors/industry-zone-development>; and news on new industrial zones: <http://www.reuters.com/article/ethiopia-industrialoutput-idUSL8N1343EO20151109>

In this framework, the approach should not be aimed at stopping migration but to enhance migration for local development, regularise international migration, while creating the conditions for reducing the involuntary international flows in the medium-long term.

Other important issues highlighted by the researches of the Ethiopian universities concern the costs of migration and scarce benefits for local development. Irregular migrants in Arab states find employment in low skill jobs. This creates a **skill waste effect** because Ethiopian migrants are literate and with good level of educations that are not enhanced.

“Participants of the focus group discussion witnessed that people are involved in irregular migration holding university degree. This can be attributed to unemployment problem in the country at large. Here having education has its own significance for irregular migrants in finding job in the destination country. But the type education they hold often does not match with market requirements. Hence, this calls for designing an intervention strategy.” (Henok et al., b, 2017)

In reality a double skill waste appears: in Ethiopia where these young men do not find the desired employment. and in destination countries where the labour market is strongly segmented at detriment of their abilities.

As already underlined, researches of Ethiopian universities indicate that **remittances are not contributing to local development**. But more analysis should be conducted in order to calculate possible multiplier effects of household consumptions financed by remittances. The consumption increase could be spent on local productions with multiplicative effects on local development. On the other hand, some information collected through interviews seem to indicate that consumption and investment implemented with the remittances are causing local inflation on specific assets such as land and houses: *“The money they get from migration is carelessly invested without calculating the realistic market price of commodities; example price for buying house, land lease bidding and the like are becoming high for which the non migrants whose income is gradual cannot cope up with the irregularly migrated ones and their families that disturb the stability of the market”* (interview to a local stakeholder in Bisrat et al, 2017).

However, the remittance impact does not depend only by the behaviour of migrants and their families, but it's linked to the **opportunities or constraints of local contexts**. In this sense rural areas' lack of material and financial infrastructures does not allow the enhancement of remittances that are spent simply in improving basic condition of life and in micro agricultural and pastoralist investment. Some information point to more investments from remittances in urban areas where better conditions exist, but they are still of small scale and fragmented in micro activities.

Social costs of irregular migration are relevant. **Students' dropout** is a diffused phenomenon. This strengthens the skill and brain waste of local human capital. But the problem, again, are the possible alternatives that local contexts do not offer. The exit choice is more attractive than the commitment for local change (Ellerman, 2003). Other important social costs are those suffered by the left behinds, especially the effect of **care drain** for children. These social costs could be addressed sustaining the local formal and informal social care networks. To this regard also migrants could play an important role in constructing a transnational welfare system. International examples show that network of mothers at distance with migrant associations commit in sustaining children left behinds. Some of these examples are supported by NGOs and international cooperations (Piperno and Tognetti, 2012)³⁹.

39 Piperno Flavia and Mara Tognetti Bordogna, 2012, *Welfare Transnazionale. La frontiera esterna delle politiche sociali*, Ediesse Saggi.

Another essential issue is **the coherence** between development and migration policies. Considering that migration flows cannot be stopped in the short terms, there is the need to substitute the transnational irregular system with **new regular channels**. Bans to irregular migrations are not effective. Regular alternatives to irregular migration should be offered.

“Whilst the suffering of illegal out migrants is indeed growing in the three woredas, legal frameworks are issued in order to contain illegal out migration and to combat human trafficking in Ethiopia: Proclamation no.104/98, No.632/2009, 736/2004. Government officials develop strategies to contain illegal out migration, but unfortunately, such efforts cannot stop illegal out migration from the study area” (Kassegne and Gashaw, 2017)

Development policies can have more impact if coherent **migration policies aim at enhancing migrant capacities and resources for local development**. Irregular flows have effects in improving families’ well-being but with high human and financial costs. The human costs of suffering and deaths along the journeys and in destination countries where migrants and labour rights are not respected. Financial costs are millions of euros spent by migrants and their families to pay for the transnational irregular migration system. This great amount of money could be invested, instead, more effectively for their well-being and for local development through the improvement of regular channels.

Informants involved in the researches of the Ethiopian universities underline **the need for a comprehensive migration policy** recognising that Ethiopia is a labour exporting country. This policy should promote more regular channels through national immigration law and international agreement, more attention to youth, more organised and less sporadic efforts to combat irregular migration, increasing local government capacities with more resources, fighting maladministration and bad governance, setting the conditions for reducing the reluctance of people to expose traffickers (Bisrat et al, 2017).

The Ethiopian-Saudi Arabia migration channel is the most important. Recent political measures, the deportation ordered by the Saudi Arabia government and the following Ethiopian ban to migrate in that country, should be overcome by a new bilateral agreement.

Finally, **more protection is needed in destination countries**. Labour rights of migrants should be respected.

“Ethiopia has ratified a number of International conventions that protect the rights of migrants and become part of national law as directed by the constitution. However, most interviewed people revealed government diplomatic efforts to protect abuse of rights is zero when compared to other countries. They heavily criticized support of the government to protect Ethiopian emigrants in the host country.” (Kassegne and Gashaw, 2017)

Recommendations

According to the findings of the researches carried out by the Ethiopian universities, and following the considerations raised in discussing the drivers and impacts of irregular migration, some recommendations are put forward for a major role of development cooperation in enhancing migrations for local development.

First of all, migrations must be conceived as a structural dynamic fueled by complex and interconnected transformative trends, and more transformations imply more internal and international migrations. Migration cannot be stopped. It must be governed trying to enhance benefits and reduce risks and costs for local communities, families and migrants themselves. Development cooperation must have

an important role in enhancing migrations, considering that remittances to Ethiopia are billions of euro overcoming the value of aid and exports.

A comprehensive migration and youth centred policy should be elaborated and integrated in the framework of the structural transformation plan sustained by the Ethiopian government. This policy should be transversal, crossing agricultural and industrial policies as well as climate change and environmental policies (as foreseen in the definition of Adaptation Plans⁴⁰). The main aims should point to the **creation of decent work in a broad based and polycentric sustainable human development enhancing migration**.

An **integrated territorial approach** balancing polarisation effects of transformative processes spurring migration flows, could be adopted, as indicated by the ADB-OECD-UNDP outlooks (2015 and 2016). Migration should be enhanced as a household strategy for diversifying risks and income earnings that could have positive impacts on local communities. This household strategy should be linked to a balanced and integrated urban and rural transformation. If local rural conditions are not sufficient to guarantee the family well-being, migrants should have the opportunity to find jobs with better salaries in national cities or abroad. Their earnings and human empowerment should contribute to the improvement of their origin communities, integrating their social and financial remittances in local rural development plans. Investments in manufacturing⁴¹ and short value chains (such as agro-industrial productions for local and national market with spill over effects on farm and non-farm activities) linking rural and urban areas should be accompanied by labour and social policies to enhance human capitals and human mobility, with vocational training and support to start ups of relevant added value firms. Integration and protection of migrants in urban areas is a complimentary measure.

Theoretically, this dynamic should reduce territorial gaps in the medium-long term, diminishing the need of involuntary migration. Development cooperation should be integrated in this framework contributing to the enhancement of migration for local development. Other structural policies are needed concerning family planning and land tenure in order to improve access and productivity of local farms, contrasting land grabbing practices.

Human, social and economic-financial capitals of migrants should be protected and sustained in their positive effects on local development. The **brain and skill waste** should be drastically reduced negotiating better integration of migrants in destination countries. The Ethiopian government could increase its efforts at regional level and bilaterally with Arab countries to plan labour mobility and measures to improve labour conditions for Ethiopian citizens.

Ethiopia could be conceived as a labour exporting country. In this sense, there is the need for a labour and education policy, with specific vocational trainings, capable to exploit labour demands in destination countries. Extension of professional training with short term courses, external verification and certification of migrant's skills could be supported. More stable and planned relations with destination countries should prevent shocking events such as deportations and protect migrant's rights.

40 See: http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/national_adaptation_plans/items/6057.php

41 Interesting is the following comments in the research of Bisrat et al. (2017): "Nowadays there is rejection by the youth that small and micro enterprises are agents of changes by looking into the practical returns from the pre established ones. Therefore, large industrial establishments and skill training centers are recommended to win the hearts and minds of the youth in the study areas".

This kind of relations should be established also with Europe in the migration compacts foreseen in the EU new partnership framework, as well as in the Common Agreement on Mobility and Migration and in the Strategic Engagement Agreement.

The care drain represents an important human and social cost for families and local communities. The network of social services at local level should be strengthened, sustaining the reintegration of returnees and the left behinds, particularly children. Government efforts have been criticised by different stakeholders during the interviews and focus groups conducted by the Ethiopian universities. More resources and capacity building are requested. Informal and formal networks of agents dedicated to children caring must be sustained. Furthermore, a transnational welfare systems should be created, supporting the capacities of women migrants in maintaining relations at distance with their children and relatives⁴². New experimental cooperation projects on this issue are financed at international level. A specific gender approach should be elaborated for the Ethiopian case, considering the importance of the migrant feminisation.

Social, economic and financial capitals of migrants should find investment opportunities in local communities of origin at rural and urban level. The positive impact of **financial remittances** depends fundamentally by the financial inclusion of migrants and their families, by the efficiency of local financial institutions and particularly by the connection between micro-finance, commercial banks and money transfer operators. The strengthening of this connection and of the financial institution capacity to manage remittances for local development represents a basic condition for the enhancement of migrant's financial capitals. Remittance corridors lowering transfer costs and new mobile transfers could be created.

This financial policy should go hand in hand with the rural and urban transformative policy aimed at increasing the manufacturing activity and the economic diversification. An enabling environment with new investment opportunities could be receptive also of the **economic remittances** of migrants, that is, of their interests in opening new small enterprises. Training, access to finance and consultancy services could accompany the migrant's decisions to invest in local enterprises.

Another option to investigate is the possibility to **mobilise social remittances**. Diaspora Ethiopian associations are collecting and sending funds to local civil society organisations for sustaining social activities, small education and health investments. Probably the creation of a Diaspora social network for human development, in collaboration with European cooperation, should interact with the Ethiopian Diaspora bonds⁴³. This network could be aimed specifically at responding to the care drain problem.

Much more efforts should be aimed at contrasting irregular flows offering more **accessible regular channels**. The transnational irregular migration system should be transformed in a formal protected and safe system. Bilateral and regional migration regimes on labour mobility are a basic condition that should be accompanied by a more efficient and effective network of public offices and private agents capable to respond in time and with low recruitment costs to the demands of migrants. The

42 Mary Romero, Valerie Preston and Wenona Giles (edited by), 2016, *When Care Work Goes Global: Locating the Social Relations of Domestic Work, Gender in a local/global world*, Routledge publishing.

43 See Frouws (2015), p. 134, on *Diaspora Bonds in Ethiopia* and more in general on the *Ethiopian diaspora policy*. On diaspora engagement see also: Katie Kuschminder and Melissa Siegel, 2011, *Understanding Ethiopian diaspora engagement policy*, UNU-MERIT Working Papers, Maastricht Economic and social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology, UNU-MERIT, Maastricht Graduate School of Governance MGSOG; and the *Ethiopian government policy in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Diaspora Policy*.

governance and coordination of different actors should be improved. Existing laws should be better enforced and corruption strongly persecuted. More effective persecution of illegal brokers is necessary as a strong signal against trafficking of human beings. This change is extremely difficult to realise: important resources and capacities should be invested in government offices at different levels as well as for improving private agencies behaviours. On the other hand, this investment would have huge benefits in terms of human risks and costs reduction, spurring new opportunities for trade and investment flows through a regular human mobility. More regular mobility means more opportunities for development.

Linked to the fight against irregular channels is the opportunity to sustain **awareness raising** activities to advise potential irregular migrants on the risks they could face. Many projects are being implemented on this issue. Returnees are involved in giving testimony about the perils of irregular journeys. However, analysis show that impacts are uncertain and should be better evaluated (Mckenzie and Yang, 2014)⁴⁴. Probably a better approach is represented by pedagogical processes conducted during the school teaching, discussing the migration issue in relation to local opportunities and commitments for human development, constructing a social awareness on the need to voice and being pro-active in pushing for local transformation without criminalising migration, but contrasting the mentality of dependence. The involvement of local schools in debating the role of migration and the problems of local development, is necessary to reduce the drop out of students and the diffusion of disillusionment on local transformation. The pedagogical processes should inform also on International Conventions on migration and on migrant's rights.

Finally, the **role of EU development cooperation** is deeply conditioned by the political and narratives on migration issues. The migration crisis in Europe is influencing the development cooperation policy. EU official communications and decisions are conceiving aid as an incentive to obtain more control on migration flows by origin and transit countries. The more for more approach is pursued by EU in negotiating with African countries more aid for more commitments in readmissions of migrants and border controls. Furthermore, the same aid could be in part diverted from the fight against poverty to migrant control measures per se. The coherence issue between development cooperation and migration policy should be tackled considering that human mobility cannot be stopped but better regulated.

⁴⁴ Mckenzie David and Dean Yang, 2014, *Evidence on Policies to increase Development Impacts of International Migrations*, Knomad working paper 2, Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD), World Bank.

Notwithstanding electoral pressures, EU should find a political solution for offering more regular channels to origin countries, with “*the creation of an “EU-wide pool” of qualified migrants, accessible to both employers and Member States’ authorities – but with the actual selection and the admission procedure remaining national, based on Member States’ actual labour market needs*”, as indicated in the European Agenda on Migration. The La Valletta Action Plan makes a list of measures to promote regular channels⁴⁵, but very little opening has been offered until now because the final decision lies in the national sovereignty of member states.

Furthermore, development cooperation should be attentive in controlling that its resources were not aimed at sustaining infrastructural projects that exacerbate conflicts on land rights and people relocations. Different local development models should be scrutinized on social and migration consequences and better practices combining local broad based development with enhancement of migration should be identified and sustained.

Resuming, the following points are highlighted as specific initiatives that development cooperation should cover:

- Integrate development cooperation and migration measures in local transformational plans identifying broad based local human development models, with focus on youth empowerment and decent jobs, where capitals of migrants could be invested
- Sustaining local productive and migration value chains between urban and rural areas accompanied by investments on labour protection and empowerment, social and spatial inclusion, housing and social services targeted to vulnerable groups also with transnational welfare projects
- Enhancing financial remittances through the improvement of financial inclusion and financial efficiency of remittance corridors
- Economic remittances should be inserted in local development plans offering consultancies and real services to important added value start-ups of migrants.
- Mobilising collective social remittances through networks of diaspora organizations with local civil society organizations, focusing investment on care drain problems
- Development cooperation could have a role in accompanying safe and regular migrations that are linked to trade and investment projects, and to human capital formation (scholarships and research initiatives with important returns for Ethiopian local development), and to specific vocational and professional trainings

⁴⁵ “Reinforce cooperation and create networks between relevant agencies and institutions in the field of job/employment creation and development with a view to facilitating placements and job opportunities; Strengthen cooperation on pre-departure measures (e.g. foreign language and vocational training) as well as rights awareness; Step up efforts to promote legal migration and mobility within bilateral cooperation frameworks such as Mobility Partnerships and Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility; Identify, as a pilot, one or more professions where participating States commit to make progress on facilitating recognition of skills and qualifications (including for migrants who decide to return to their country of origin – circular migration schemes). Treat the portability of social rights of lawfully residing migrants, in conformity with international conventions, bilateral conventions, and national laws applicable in this area. Support continental, regional and sub-regional frameworks for mobility and migration, such as the Joint Labour Migration Programme adopted at the African Union Summit in January 2015 and other initiatives developed by ECOWAS and IGAD. (Valletta Summit, 11-12 November 2015, Action Plan)

Development cooperation could have a specific important role in mobilizing local research on the nexus between migration and development, as demonstrated by the Italian Cooperation investment in the analysis carried out by the Ethiopian universities. This experience demonstrates the benefit of working together between a Public Institution, NGOs and local Universities. Another positive evolution of this experience should be the support to a triangulation between south-south and north-south research institutes. In particular, south-south research can be more useful in exchanging knowledge and policy recommendations, forging regional approaches on south-south migration, which is more important than that to Europe.

Researches' Summaries

1

Irregular Migration in Eastern Zone of Tigray: Causes, Consequences and Alternative Strategies

By Bisrat Weldesilassie, Teklebrhan Berhe, Weldeabrha Niguse and Muuz Abrha (Adigrat University)

Irregular Migration has globally reached alarming level and thus, has posed a challenge to sending, transit and destination countries. Attempts aimed to reduce irregular migration needs proper investigation of the drivers, the consequences and possible solutions as well. From the perspective of destination countries, irregular migration is illegal entry, stay or work in a country, meaning that the migrant does not have the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations to enter, reside in or work in a given country. From the perspective of the source country, the irregularity is seen, for example, in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfil the administrative requirements for leaving the country. Although differences in the economic, political and social contexts limit generalizations, certain features of irregular migration are more or less universal.

In the Ethiopian scenario, although concerted efforts are being made to overcome poverty, the country is still one of the countries who face a severe development challenges. Due to the high population growth, the actual numbers of declined poverty are marginal. With a view to addressing these challenges, the Government of Ethiopia has adopted a series of development policy and program frameworks, particularly since the beginning of the millennium. The Government's five-year Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP 2011-2015) had the aim to accelerate sustainable development that focuses on job-creating economic activities, which speed up economic growth as a means of reducing poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) backed up with the GTP II (2016-2020). The GTP is the first in a series of three five-year plans, designed to guide the country's transformation towards the attainment of a middle income country status

Purpose of the study

With approximately three million young Ethiopians entering the labour force every year, ensuring productive employment opportunities for them is one of the challenges posed in both rural and urban areas. As a result, growing numbers of Ethiopians have been looking for job opportunities either in other regions within the country or abroad, through regular and irregular channels. This study, funded by the Italian Cooperation through CISP, closely examined the root causes, actors and consequences of irregular migration in Eastern zone of Tigray. It also assessed relevancy and appropriateness of income generating, school support and health enhancement activities done by the consortium members (VIS_ADCS, CISP and CCM). Migration in the broad sense and irregular one in particular, has been increasing rapidly over the past years and has become a matter of serious concern and a priority area for action. In the regional context, the

Tigray regional state has been one of the most affected regions of irregular migration, within the country. From the regional context, the number of irregular migration cases in Eastern zone of Tigray outnumbered reported cases of irregular migration in other parts of the region.

Research Methodology

The study area

Eastern zone of Tigray regional state is found in the most northerly part of the country bordered by Afar regional state in the east, by South Eastern zone in the south, by Central zone in the west and by Eritrea in the north. According to 2007 Census conducted by CSA, the Zone has a total population of 755,343, of whom 359,638 are men and 395,705 women; 146,064 or 19.34% are urban inhabitants. The two largest ethnic groups in Eastern zone are Tigray (95.32%) and Irob (3.78%); all other ethnic groups made up 0.9% of the population. Tigrigna is spoken as a first language by 95.36% and Saho language by 3.67%; the remaining 0.97% spoke all other primary languages as indicated by the CSA in 2007. With respect to religion, Orthodox, Muslims and catholic take 95.73%, 2.4% and 1.79% respectively. Though livelihood of the zone is dominantly dependent on agriculture, recurrent drought, insignificant land holdings and infertility of the existing plot are hindering agricultural production. There is significant irregular transnational migration from Eastern zone of Tigray, the main destinations being Gulf of Aden, mainly the Republic of Saudi Arabia followed by Europe.

Research approach and design

The study employed mixed approach – both quantitative and qualitative methods – to reduce the limitation of data collected through single method and adopted a cross sectional research design. Primary data was collected through field work while second data was obtained from existing sources including previous studies, reports of governmental and non-governmental bodies, policy documents and declarations, internet sources and others related to the topic under study. Six Woredas with higher irregular outmigration were purposefully selected from the nine administrative units in eastern zone of Tigray; Irob, Gulomekada, Saesie Tsaeda emba, Gantafeshum, Atsbi wenberta, and Wukro kilte awlaelo. Six Kebeles, one from each woreda, were taken purposively for the same reason. As there was no sampling frame available, purposive and then snowball sampling techniques were followed to reach at the respondents – returnees and potential migrants. Out of 5,365 sample population, 372 respondents were taken using Taro Yemane's sample size determination formula (1967), at 5 % level of precision. Questionnaire, key informant interview and Focus Group Discussions were used to collect data. The quantitative data was processed using SPSS version 20.0 and was presented in descriptive statistic, while qualitative data were thematically and systematically summarized and analysed

Findings

When socio-demographic profile of the respondents is examined, 217 out of 372 (59.3 %) were male and 149 (40.7%) were female. Here, it shows that more males are involved in irregular migration than females, though the difference is not so high. According to age, from 25 to 30 age group took the largest share, 172 (47 %), followed by the age group between 19-25 years, which accounts for 121 (33.1 %). The 30 and above age group takes about 72 (20.2) of the total respondents. In terms of literacy, only 12(3.3%) of the respondents did not have any education while the rest 344 (96.7 %) were literate at different level of education ladder including University degree and above qualifications. The majority of the respondents, i.e., 236 (64 %) was single. This in turn makes them readier to migrate compared to the married ones.

Being young, literate and single, all together make them more vulnerable to irregular migration than their counterparts. It represents a highly potential migrant population. It implies likeliness of increasing trend of irregular migration in the future. But it is not very strong predictor alone.

It is often assumed that economic reason, poverty, was the main if not the only reason for irregular migration of youth. As this study shows, poverty accompanied by unemployment is paramount, accounting for 66 % of push factors. The perceived better job opportunity and better pay along with the value of exchange rate are economic pull factors (57%), while propaganda of the smugglers/traffickers took 29.2%. Yet, other psychological, and socio-cultural factors like youth's desire to get rich overnight, community's attitude towards migration and culture of reluctance to expose traffickers also have significant share. Problems of governance, poor infrastructure, no war no peace situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, particularly in border woredas, strong social networks are other additional factors that increase irregular migration from the area. The irregular system is widening: hotels, shops, coffee houses/cafes are increasingly involved in irregular migration as information centers, money transfer channels, temporary shelters etc.

The routes mentioned for irregular migration from eastern zone are; 1. Eastern zone-Humera-Sudan-Libiya-Italy Route to Europe; 2. A) Eastern zone-Mekelle-Affar-Djibuti-Yemen-Saudi Arabiya; and B) Eastern zone-Mekelle-Allamata-Addis Ababa-JigJiga-Somalia-Yemen-S.Arabia. The main destination of irregular migration that are currently active are Saudi Arabia and Europe. The main actors in irregular migration from the area are smugglers and traffickers (50.9 %) and migrants themselves (30.1%). Others including parents, government officials, shops, coffee houses etc. take 18 %.

It is often argued that migration can be a strategy for household livelihood and national development at large; yet temporal, geographical, political and socioeconomic settings have to be carefully considered. Current findings reveal that migration remittances slightly increased household income for some migrant sending households, thereby relaxing expenditure restraint for daily consumption, health and education. The overall effect of irregular migration however, is seen to be detrimental to the community and the country as well. Because, first, the positive effect mentioned is not only insignificant but also temporary. Second, the negative effects in terms of sufferings and death of the migrants, involuntary mobility among the youth at home, financial burden to the family

members as well as social and politico-legal crises are insidious. Individuals are paying tens and hundreds of thousands of Birr to cross to Arab countries or Europe with the help of smugglers. The activity's being profitable to the smugglers, in turn brings additional smugglers and traffickers into play. This creates vicious circle where more lives are perished, sending communities are impoverished, illegal actors are proliferated and thus, lawlessness is worsened and overall result is negative.

The efforts of combating irregular migration so far were ineffective due to: less attention given to youth and youth oriented activities; inherent problems in the legal framework, the community's reluctance to expose traffickers; maladministration and sporadic and uncoordinated nature of the efforts.

Recommendations

Two goals can be pursued; reducing irregular migration and mainstreaming migration in development. Doing so, in the first place,

- attitudinal and behavioural change of the community is needed; particularly, the youth.
- Expanding local resource and demand based, sustainable investments can create employment opportunity for many jobless youth at the same time
- initiating local development. Entrepreneurship, knowledge and skill based trainings, micro credit services, continuous support and follow-up, are needed from governments or other development partners.
- ensuring regional peace and security,
- opening window for legal migration and remittance transfer channels with reasonable tax, can contribute in reducing irregular migration as well as making migration support local economic development.

To sum up, popular participation at grassroots level; local resource and demand or comparative advantage orientated investment/employment creation; good governance, legal avenues for migration with regional and international peace and cooperation are central mechanisms to reduce irregular migration in the area.

Contact: Bisrat Weldesilassie | biswelb@gmail.com

2

Causes and Consequences of Irregular Migration in Bale Zone, Oromia Regional State, South Eastern Ethiopia.

By Henok Yohannes, Seid Mekonen, Marcon Bashaye and Birhanu Negeri
(Madda Walabu University) - First research

By Henok Yohannes, Tizazu Ayalew Teka, Mesfin Abraham and Getachew Demisse
(Madda Walabu University) - Second research

Migration has been an integral part of human activity since the ancient times. Nonetheless, recently, irregular migration has become a global concern due to the various consequences it is entailing on migrants and on source and destination countries. In source countries like Ethiopia, the issue is being brought to the forefront of political debates, academic researches and international and national summit. Over the past decade, Bale Zone, found in the regional state of Oromia, is one the principal areas in Ethiopia which has seen a surge in the number of irregular migrants. With the object identifying and addressing the root causes and consequences of irregular migration in Bale Zone, two closely related studies were conducted, with the technical and financial support obtained from Italian Cooperation AICS and Cooperazione Internazionale – COOPI. The initial study involved a baseline exploration of the socio-economic conditions of returnees and potential migrants in the district and the final study involved analytical assessment of the cause and consequences of irregular migration in the district.

The principal aim of the baseline survey was to collect baseline information and to assess the contributing driving factors of migration from Sinana, Robe and Goba Districts. More specifically, the base line study attempted to identify the skills and socioeconomic status of returnees, the determinants of potential migration and the specific drivers of the decision to migrate. On the other hand, the second research aimed at identifying and quantifying the factors that cause and perpetuate irregular migration and the resulting consequences of such migration on migrants and returnees (and their families) originating from the selected Sinana, Robe Gassera, Agarfa and Ginir districts of Bale Zone of Oromia regional state.

To achieve the aforementioned objectives, both studies adopted a mixture of qualitative and quantitative tools of analysis. The whole baseline study, being cross-sectional and descriptive in design, was made prior to the final research and used different sample size and sample respondents. Both studies relied on a combination of Purposive, Stratified and Simple random sampling techniques to select appropriate samples. The instruments of data collection applied in the baseline study were questionnaire and in-depth interviews while the second study utilized Focus Group Discussions in addition. For analysing data collected in such manner, the baseline study applied mainly descriptive statistics whereas the second research used, additionally, inferential statistics involving binary logistic regression and Chi-square tests of significance.

In the baseline survey two types of questionnaires (for returnees and Potential migrants) and an in-depth interview were the instruments utilized for data collection. Using sample

size for population proportion formula, the study took a sample of 259 individuals which was about 32.9 % of the total number of 785 officially registered individuals comprising of 361 returnees and 424 Potential migrants. Afterwards, purposive sampling technique was employed to identify the actual sampled areas, two districts and one administrative town, in view of the presence of larger number of reported returnees. Stratified sampling technique was then used to allocate representative sample sizes from each district and followed by simple random sampling technique to identify the respondents.

In the second research a sample of 326 migrant and non-migrant respondents were selected using purposive, stratified and simple random sampling techniques in the manner followed for the baseline study. Furthermore, a combination of purposive and snowball-sampling techniques was employed to identify people who have direct and indirect experiences on migration.

Additionally, reports and opinions of local government agents were used to render the pattern and trend of migration in the zone. The analysis was further complemented by quantitative analysis on the determinants of migration routes and on the catalysts of migration in general and irregular migration in particular. This was done using a binary logistic regression analysis, in conjunction the Chi-square test of significant differences across important variables of interest, with the hope to identify the factors that determine the choice of migration routes.

The administrative town of Robe and the district of Sinana were taken as sample districts in both studies. Additionally, the baseline study took a sample of individuals from the district of Goba, while three other districts of Bale Zone (Gassera, Agarfa and Ginir) were purposively selected to identify respondents for the final research.

Presently Bale-zone is the largest administrative zone of Oromia regional state and it comprises of 18 districts and three administrative towns. Robe town is the capital of the zone which is located about 430 Kms away southeast of Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia. The zone's has an estimated population of more than 1.4 million with the majority (85%) depending on agriculture as source of livelihood. Islam is the popular religion in the zone with about 76% of the population practicing it.

Over the past five or more years, the zone has seen a surge in the number of migrants. Between the period 2011/12 and 2015/16, there have been a total of 3726 officially reported incidences of out migration. The sheer number of reported migrant cases has dropped to 268 in the year 2012/13 from the 2011/12 figure of about 1157 cases. This figure has resurged to 1505 cases in the year 2015/16. In particular, the share of migrant returnees for Sinana district increased from 11% in 2012/2013 to 27% in 2015/2016 whereas, for Robe town, this figure increased from 11% in 2013/2014 to 63% in 2014/2015.

For the specific baseline study areas, about 80% of respondents were migrant returnees out of which 56% were irregular migrants. Male returnees comprise the majority of respondents in both the general returnee group (63%) and the irregular returnee group (75%).

These irregular returnees were in general dominantly single in their marital status (62%) and came from families with a size of 4-6 members (57%) which is comparable to the situation of regular returnees who were also mainly single (58%) and come from families of size 4 -6 (41%).

Relatedly, a majority of respondents have attended secondary general schools for both irregular returnees (51%) and regular returnee (48%) groups. With respect to source of income, about 69% of all migrants and 81% of non-migrants rely on their current

employment whereas about 18% of migrants and 9.4% of non-migrants have reported remittances as their source of income.

The popular destination region for both regular and irregular returnees was the Middle East where about 89% of all migrants, 87% of irregular migrants and 93% of regular migrants have destined to this region in their very last episode of international migration.

Migration to other African countries (6%) and to European and North American (2%) countries has in general been rare.

The variables of interest that emerged to describe the pattern of migrants in the baseline study were age, gender, family size and income level. For instance, males constituted 57.3% of the entire migrant returnee in the three districts of study. Similarly, 28.66% of these migrant returnees came from family size of 2 – 5 members. Before migration, returnees have had a month income in the range of between a minimum of 300 ETB and a maximum of 5700 ETB.

In the second study, once again, male returnees comprised the majority of respondents in both the general returnee group (63%) and the irregular returnee group (75%) with the overwhelming majority (73%) of the returnee migrants being youths in the age between 20 and 29 years of age. Furthermore, 57% of irregular returnees and 41% of regular returnees came from families with a size of 4-6 members. 51% of irregular returnees and 48% of regular returnees, from the second study, have attended secondary general education. With respect to source of income, about 69% of all migrants and 81% of non-migrants rely on their current employment whereas about 18% of migrants and 9.4% of non-migrants have reported remittances as their source of income. These returnees in general have had a monthly income in the range of 100 and 3000 ETB before the incidence of migration. With regard to the causes of migration, on both of the researches, the pull factors of migration are similar with the push factors in as much as they are economic in nature. The result of the baseline survey revealed that unemployment and low paying jobs (58%), poverty (56%), family pressure (28%), peer pressure (23%), agricultural land scarcity (17%), scarcity of capital to start own business (17%), security (16%) and others (2%) were the main reported push factors of migration. As to the pull factors, ample job opportunities (57%), high paying jobs (43%), and social network (26%) were the dominant pulling facets in the destination countries.

Similarly, the findings from the second research identified that the causes of migration are significantly associated with economic reasons which exerted push or pull forces in the migration decision process. Unemployment followed by poverty was reported as the main factor that pushed and motivated migration in general and irregular migration in particular. An influence from illegal brokers is also found to have a non-negligible role as a pushing factor.

Furthermore, the regression analysis from the second research suggested that migration route choices and vulnerability to irregular migration vary across individual's gender, age, educational status, family size and perception towards employment opportunities in the home versus destination countries. More specifically, in the areas studied male youngsters dominate out-migration both through legal and illegal mechanisms. Males are also more prone to irregular migration than females. The likelihood of migrating irregularly is 6 times higher for males than females whereas females were 3 times more likely to migrate regularly than their male counterparts were. In terms of educational status, it was found that as the educational qualification of migrants increase from primary to secondary and to college degree, the likelihood of irregular mode of immigration decreases. This indicates that individuals with lower educational qualifications are more vulnerable to irregular

migration than those who attend college or some other advanced education. In addition, being young further adds to the vulnerability problem as established by the finding that the likelihood of irregular migration was 4 times higher for the age group 21-25 than individuals with the age of 35 years or more. However, for the areas studied in the second research, migrant network and income of individuals had exerted no systematic influence on the choice of migration route.

A look at the smuggling network of migrant returnees showed that returnees have used three channels for migration to Saudi Arabia. The first one is the so-called 'public migration', which is popular for officially registered (with the Ethiopian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs) migrants, and the second channel takes place through one of the legally registered Private Employment Agencies. However, both of these regular or official channels were banned by the Ethiopian government in 2013.

The third channel is irregular and returnees in this group have used the smuggling network of either: through Afar to Bossaso, Puntland, into Yemen (and from there potentially further on to Saudi Arabia) or through Afar to Djibouti, into Yemen and from there potentially further on to Saudi Arabia, or from Bale to Harar to Djibouti, into Yemen

In terms of the consequences migration, the second study suggested that migrants do send remittances to their families so long as the life threatening risks associated with the process of irregular migration and one or the other types of exploitations in the destination countries have been successfully avoided. However, the FGDs and interviews suggested that the risks facing labor migrants are prevalent and of different severity and successfully avoiding them is beyond the personal capacity of the migrant and is a result of pure luck. Some of these risks facing migrants include financial exploitation, psychological and physical assault, hunger, thirst, sexual abuses, detention, deportation and racial attacks. In addition, labour exploitation, involuntary servitude, kidnapping for the sake of ransom, forced confinements and loss of lives at extreme case were also reported to be prevalent. Labour migrants were highly exposed to such a kind of risks regardless of the legality or illegality of their migration status. Interestingly enough, the study finds that the exploitative practices were undertaken by traffickers and smugglers including employers, illegal brokers, private employment agents and security bodies.

Regarding choices of route of migration, the base line survey from the three districts showed that 86.2% of all returnees have used one or more of the unofficial routes of migration, i.e., they were irregular migrants. Their reasons for choosing to travel in such manner were; for the involved lower cost of travel (47.7%), for the bureaucracy and high regulation associated with the regular channel (13%), for inaccessibility of regular channels (6.4%) and for lack of information (9.1%). These findings were also confirmed in the final research with minor differences in the order of their importance.

Specifically, the main reported reasons, in the second study, for choosing to travel irregularly, in their degree of supremacy, are its cheapness (33%), inaccessibility of regular routes (27%), the bureaucracy associated with travelling in regular routes (18%) and influence or persuasion of brokers (15%).

Furthermore, the second research identified that poverty and absence of decent sources of income or employment opportunities in migrants' locality of origin on one hand and the abundance of the same in destination countries on the other hand, or at least having this particular perception, are the main factors that push and pull people to migrate regardless of the route of migration.

Hence, in line with the main findings of the two research papers, it is recommended that reducing the volume and negative consequences of irregular migration requires the

joint efforts of different stakeholders including but not limited to local community and religious leaders, government and non-governmental organization (at local, national and international levels). The areas of intervention should mainly include expanding vocational training institutions, reshaping the attitude of the community and providing the necessary arrangement and entrepreneur training for vulnerable sections of the community.

In addition to this, creating job opportunity at place of origin, eradicating poverty, and effective persecution of illegal brokers ought to be the primary concerns for of concerned government and non-government agents. Further, providing effective and efficient assistance and protective measures for victims of migrants resulted from migration in general and irregular migration in particular should also be given emphasis.

3

Causes and Consequences of Irregular Migration in Tigray, Ethiopia

By Kelemework Tafere, Zenawi Gebremeskel, Tsehaye Weldegiorgis, Awet Hailezgi and Kelil Demsis (Mekelle University)

A study was conducted in four zones of Tigray region, Viz. North western, Western, Central, and Southern Zones of Tigray Region to find out the causes, trends and consequences of irregular migration in the region. 8 specific Woredas (2 from each zone) were chosen for the research on the basis of the prevalence, magnitude and frequency of irregular migration. The findings of the research reveal that there have been multiple stressors and a number of pull and push factors responsible for the flight of thousands of young people of the region to Europe and the Gulf States. Poverty and unemployment, limited access to land and credit opportunities coupled with maladministration and corruption have been cited as principal push factors while the quest for better life abroad and influences from families and friends with migration experiences have also contributed to the seemingly unending state of irregular migration affecting many households in rural and urban areas. Bad governance has also been pointed out as a salient factor complicating the migration crisis. Although the government has come up with proclamation 909/2015 which clearly stipulates irregular migration as an issue of top national priority, little has hitherto been done to disseminate the law to those in the grassroots. There is a lack of awareness among the general public about the provisions of the proclamation creating loopholes in term of developing proper understanding and perusal of action against brokers, traffickers, and smugglers. The governance system has proved to be ineffective in breaking the network of traffickers operating within the country and abroad. There is absence of coordinated efforts by the regional states and countries affected by irregular migration. The lack of strong functional integration between various stakeholders has given traffickers and smugglers the leverage to continue creating havoc. To make matters even worse, bail rights given to traffickers have caused the disappearance of culprits before they can be brought to justice. Irregular migration has now become pervasive and has spread to areas where long distance movements of people were uncommon in the past. For example, according to informants in the north western and Western zones, the presence of Eritrean refugee camps in Shire have had bad precedence as the Eritreans are highly mobile and affected the state of affairs of the local youth in the area; and the fact that Western Tigray is close to the international border and a prime route for irregular migration have made young people of the area vulnerable for trafficking.

The study used both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies and a wide range of data collection tools that combined primary and secondary sources of information. Conditions of migrants and potential migrants were addressed by a survey questionnaire which was administered to a sample of 343 respondents (265 returnees and 78 potential migrants). Qualitative data was mainly obtained from members of the community and local administration. A total of 10 FGDs and 24 Key informant interviews and 12 case studies were conducted with elders, religious leaders and key figures in the governance system as well as specific individuals with particular unique stories to tell. Primary data was supported by information obtained from secondary sources. The

Bureau of Labour and Social Affairs(BoLSA) as well as Youth and Sports Bureau were instrumental in providing data pertinent to current trends in irregular migration across the different zones and Woredas.

Tigray region is one of the 9 regional states of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. It is found in the northern tip of the country and is home for over 4 million people with only 19% of the population living in urban locations (CSA, 2007.). Tigray regional state is divided into 7 administrative zones and several Woredas including 35 rural Woredas. Agriculture is the backbone of the economy although some members of the local communities augment their subsistence income with other income earning activities such as petty trade, off-farm and non-farm wage labour.

The region has been severely affected by recurrent wars and drought which affected the lives of millions of people especially in the 1980's. The area is characterized by arid environment, presence of rugged mountains, shortage of rainfall, degradation and fragmentation of arable land that led to food insecurity and economic calamities for many years. An increase in population density especially in the central part of the region over the last several decades has led to land scarcity and further impoverishment of farm households. In response to problems of food security in the region, the successive governments of Ethiopia have taken several measures to alleviate poverty and ensure household food self-sufficiency. One such measure has been the resettlement of vulnerable households on fertile grounds in remote regions. Resettlement schemes implemented during the Derg regime following the infamous 1984/5 drought and famine has been severely criticized for being coercive and involuntary. The region has also been exposed to a series of wars that led to human catastrophe and property wreckage since time immemorial; the recent being the 17 years struggle against the Marxist DERG regime and the subsequent Ethio-Eritrean border war over a disputed land called Badme. These wars have at times created IDPs and have had far reaching impacts on people's livelihoods. Thus migration is not a new experience to the Tigrayan populations in northern Ethiopia. But the current wave of people is different because it is largely unregulated and is carried out under the cover of darkness making it challenging to obtain concrete data on the magnitude of the problem and trends. According to an interview with officials from BoLSA, irregular migration of the youth still exists even today although not at an extraordinarily exodus level. In some areas, several factors have contributed to a slight decline in the trend. These factors include, unfavorable conditions associated with seasonal changes, government control and interventions and fear of unwanted eventualities, e.g. attacks by Al Shabab and ISIS during designated unsafe periods during which foreign enemy movements are anticipated. However, this does not mean that there has been fundamental change in the attitudes, wishes and desires of the youth to migrate abroad and a substantial decline in irregular migration is still far from a reality.

As has been amply demonstrated, poverty is the main driving force in irregular migration. Following academic failures and even after undertaking college level education, opportunities for employment become slim. Findings of the survey research indicate that in the rural areas, 82.1% of the potential migrants are landless and without a sustainable means of livelihood and 50.6% of the potential migrants are unemployed. Social factors such as peer pressure also play pivotal roles in irregular migration. Results of the survey research indicate that 57.4% of the returnees were influenced and encouraged by their friends in the process of deciding to migrate abroad; while 37.2% of the potential migrants were influenced by friends living abroad. Often such influences are less direct and take the

form of social media communications including encounters on Facebook and other outlets. The findings of the study reveal that there are two major trajectories and routes of irregular migration affecting the study sites. The major destinations are European countries and Arab states mainly Saudi-Arabia. One route takes into consideration movement from areas of origin to Libya with Sudan as the first international exit line. The other direction considers Yemen and Saudi-Arabia via Somalia as first international transit destination. Returnees argued that although they knew journeys to Europe provided better socio-economic returns, the cost of migration was found to be higher (often more than 10 times) compared to migration to Arab countries as a result of which majority of migrants opted for the latter. Returnees asserted that they experienced despicable sufferings across the journey to destination countries. These include, among other things, torture, hunger, thirst and sexual abuse to mention just a few. Traffickers and smugglers have also detained migrants for indefinite period of time and demanded ransom money from their families and threatening to kill their hostage if their demands are not met. Such ransom money is often paid by selling assets and belongings that led to draining of family resources. The physical and psychological abuse lingered on even after arrival in destination countries as illegal migrants lived in a state of fear and anxiety emanating from lack of proper documentations of residence permit.

The impacts of irregular migration are multifaceted. First and foremost, migrants make cost benefit analysis before they make important decisions to move out. They reported that they earned better salaries in foreign countries compared to what they used to earn at home. However, a lot of challenges have also been discussed. The migration process is a venture that requires mobilization of financial resources to cover costs associated with the long and tiresome journey to the promised lands. This money often comes from contribution of family members and credit. Repaying of loan money is a lengthy and painful process. In addition, upon arrival, migrants face the daunting task of having to cope with an entirely new physical and social environment characterized by alien culture, language and religion and a harsh weather condition. In addition, some health threats have also been reported. Furthermore, sudden and unprecedented deportations often led to migrants not being able to bring their belongings. On the social dimension, irregular migration leads to disintegration of family ties and bondages and in some cases even to divorce and collapse of support networks. The impact of irregular migration on community welfare is vague given the fact that remittance money is mainly spent on immediate family consumptions and repayment of loans. The few exceptionally rich returnees prefer to invest in other bigger towns where they can open businesses and earn better profit.

In light of the above findings, the team of researchers from Mekelle University would like to extend the following recommendations:

- 1) There are already some government packages for youth development especially in the form of training, loan service, and organization of MSEs although the demand by far exceeds supply. Such government resources must adequately address the needs of the poorest of the poor particularly the jobless and landless people. In addition, there must be follow up measures, efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery as well as proper market linkages to make them economically self-sufficient.
- 2) Continuous awareness and sensitization campaigns must be put in place especially on the legal framework surrounding migration (e.g. Proc. 909/2015) and the pros

and cons associated with it under legal and illegal trajectories

- 3) Regulating Illicit Financial Transfers (cooperation with financial institutions)
- 4) Legal protection must be given to witnesses and incentive provided for those who expose traffickers, smugglers and brokers to justice organs
- 5) Synergy between different government institutions must be established in a way that promotes economy of scale and judicious utilization of available resources. There is a need for harmonization of informal dispute settlement mechanism with formal justice organs
- 6) The migration command post must be further strengthened and empowered to take proactive measures at all levels of the regional administration
- 7) Reintegration of returnees should always be incorporated into the annual plans at all levels of administration
- 8) There must be strong regional/international cooperation and networking among those affected by irregular migration
- 9) There should be a system of accountability by pertinent government bodies that have a stake on the prevention and control of irregular migration.

4

Determinants and Dimension of Irregular Migration: the Case of Habro, Darolebu and Mieso Weredas of Oromia National Regional State, Ethiopia.

By Tekalign Diyana, Muktar Mohammed and Ahmed Mohammed
(Oda Bultum University)

This abstract resume the main findings of the research undertaken to identify the determinants of irregular migration in three districts of West Harerghe zone of Oromia national regional state. The analysis focused on individual/household level considering the following aspects: socio-demographic profile of migrants; environmental, economic and social factors influencing the decision to migrate; and a special attention was dedicated to the nexus between social cohesion and migration. Social cohesion has been represented through indicators on: individual perception/attitude towards the community, trust and social capital, women empowerment, and collective action.

Like many findings highlighted by the literature on migration, the result of this research underscores the multi-dimensionality of factors that cause and facilitate irregular migration. Specifically, individual availability of physical and human capital, access to common resources and age are among the factors that negatively and significantly correlate with the probability to migrate irregularly. In the same way, variables representing social cohesion associate negatively with probability to migrate.

The geographical area of the study is known for its degraded environment and over population. The effects of climate change are worsening the environmental conditions of the area and the livelihoods of local population. As secondary data from different sources indicate, the irregular migration flows are increasing in last decades. Hence taking action by identifying and fighting the root causes of migration is of utmost importance for the human development of West Harerghe.

The research was implemented through a household survey: 284 interviews to families with out-migrants, returnees and non-migrant were conducted collecting data and information. About 60 percent of the respondents indicated the high cost requirement for regular migration as an important factor explaining why individuals choose irregular channel for migration, followed by the lack of knowledge about legal procedures. Making legal way of migration possible and accessible is a basic condition to save the life of people endangered along the journey, as well as supporting awareness creation by concerned government body on the high risks of irregular migration.

Regarding respondents' decision for choosing irregular routes: the migrants themselves take the main role for deciding to move. Families and peers play a secondary role in the decision and, surprisingly, brokers are indicated as marginal actors. This finding supports the recommendation to implement actions aimed at influencing the attitude of migrants.

Importantly, even if factors identified using descriptive statistics and econometric model are somewhat similar, vivid difference exists regarding the degree of significance identified by the two methods. To indicate some, descriptive results about drivers of

irregular migration identified poverty (defined as inability to feed families through-out the year and three times a day) as the main reason to migrate, followed by unemployment and shortage of agricultural land as second and third factors pushing people to migrate. Among the attracting factors, respondents identified in the ranking of pull factors: expectation of getting high income abroad; availability of job opportunity at destination; and facilitators/brokers.

More specifically, the probit model estimated low asset owned by individuals, expectation of high income abroad, availability of social network and membership in social institution as significant factors that contribute to migration; while age, educational background and ownership of resources with the community are factors that can mitigate migration, if their accessibility and quality is enough to accommodate the concerned people in the community.

A deepened analysis was dedicated to look more closely at the concept of social cohesion and how it relates to migration. Relevant and representative indicators of social cohesion dimensions have been identified, using them for multivariate regression to develop social cohesion index related to migration. The main dimensions analyzed were: social capital; institutional and collective action; gender; individual perception on fairness and common goods; trust and attitude. The following factors were chosen to represent the dimensions: rate of trust on local leaders; acceptance and respect individuals have within the society; level of trust among people within the society; degree of perception for local leaders decision; perception of decision and rules by elders, who trust in economic failure; and right females have on resource in common with male. These seven factors upon 20 variables, explain about 60% of the total indicators incorporated to measure social cohesion index.

In general, the findings of the research clearly identifies the determinant factors of irregular migration in the three woredas of West Harerghe zone by taking both descriptive and econometric analysis. The relation of probability of migration and social cohesion indicators at least at the community level is estimated. The results of multivariate regression analysis indicate the existence of strong negative correlation between indicators of social cohesion and probability of migrating. This sustains the recommendation of investing to strengthening of social cohesion and conserve common and natural resources to mitigate the possibility of irregular migration. Moreover, building the asset base of individuals sustainably is another point that the results disclosed.

Recommendation

Based on the findings of the research discussed above the following recommendations are drawn.

As the findings of descriptive analysis and econometric results indicate there is no single factor that determines irregular migration, rather a collection of factors from different dimensions collectively plays role for migration. The factors can vary from place to place and time to time. Moreover, factors that are represented in the descriptive statistics analysis are less significant under econometric finding. As the econometric analysis depends on test based analysis and also identifies relative importance of each significant variable, the authors recommend the use of appropriate econometric analysis for identifying accurate causes of irregular migration.

As the current finding indicates, different factors like social capital inversely correlates with irregular migration, improving such factors like education opportunity and quality is one important dimension of mitigating irregular migration.

Income generating activities and awareness creation should be supported in the study area to improve capital base of individuals, develop livelihood system and improve knowledge base of communities about risks of migration, procedures for legal migration, expected income in countries of destination and the possibility of getting more and safe income at home, in order to improve the attitude of population against irregular migration. Moreover, as descriptive results revealed, the government should facilitate and creates means of regular way for migration to minimize the risk of irregular migration.

In addition to the above, as the current study depends only on cross-sectional data in one geographical zone on people with similar culture, future works are recommended to expand the spatial and temporal coverage of the issue.

Finally, as this research was relied only at the origin of the migration route, future works are recommended to consider the destination and also transits issues and factors, on order to have a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomena.

5

Magnitude, Determinants and Effects of Illegal Out-Migration from South Wollo Zone, with a particular Emphasis on selected Woredas

By Kassegne Damtew and Gashaw Mohamed, (Wollo University)

The purpose of this study is to explore the magnitude, determinants, and effects of low skilled illegal out-migration with reference to Ambasel, Tehuledere and Worebabo woredas in South Wollo, Amhara Region. Here are specific objectives addressed by the research:

1. To assess the magnitude of illegal out-migration from the three woredas : Ambasel, Tehuledere and Worebabo
2. To identify the major determinants that influence illegal out-migration from study Woredas
3. To detect the major modes of illegal out-migration: Ambasel, Tehuledere and Worebabo
4. To study the risks associated with illegal out-migration in the mentioned Woredas
5. To explore the economic, social & psychological effect of illegal out- migration in the three woredas.

In order to collect respondents' opinions, questionnaires, interviews and focus group discussions were employed. The target group respondents were returnees, emigrants' families and community leaders who included officers from local administration, religious leaders and elders. The result of the study shows an increment of low skilled illegal migration due to the effect of push and pull factors. Potential emigrants are pushed by their problems as they see migration as the sole option for improving their life and are lured by successful migrants' achievements that enhance them in making a decision. Thus, people who rush to cross borders are faced with severe problems by inhuman and brutal act of smugglers including money requested in the transit country Yemen and only migrants who fulfill smugglers requests continue their journey to their destination countries. Some are detained at the border, and some succeed in migrating but fail to remit. The effect of illegal migration is found to be positive but many outcomes have negative consequences. The positive effects are benefits of remittances and the negative consequence of migration is represented by a large outflow of human capital from the study region, physical and emotional violence, death and acute illness, as well as economic crisis for migrants' families.

Methodology

This study is a mixed approach of qualitative and quantitative research in which the researchers, collect qualitative and numeric data from participants, analyze these numbers using statistics, and conducts the inquiry in an unbiased, objective manner. In order to investigate the phenomenon of illegal out-migration in the target area mechanisms the research methodology included oral information from south Wollo Zone concerned officers and officials, explored the study areas, searched related ideas from archives and secondary sources, prepared questionnaires for respondents and used structured

questions for key informants, and arranged focus group discussions with selected individuals of each Woreda Qebeles. The research design for this study is descriptive in nature and cross-sectional method to explore antecedent factors, magnitude, risk and effects of illegal out migration. The research includes surveys and fact-finding enquiries. The sampling technique employed to identify respondents was simple random sampling and convenience non-probability sampling. Data was collected using primary and secondary sources and analyzed using descriptive and statistical analysis. The researchers tried to describe the current state of illegal migration from South Wollo in particular in the three target Woredas, and to explain the determinant factors that could influence out-migration and attract illegal emigrants. The researchers did not try to control any of the variables but rather to report the characteristics of variables in a descriptive manner. Hence, this research is designed to be descriptive while qualitative and quantitative methods were employed.

Geographical, environmental, social and economic context and magnitude, trends and destinations of migration

This study is conducted in South Wollo specifically, Ambassel, Tehuledere and Worebabo woredas. The three woredas are located east of South Wollo zone, in Amhara regional state characterized by dramatic gorges and slopes leading down to lowland plains. This difficult topography creates problems of accessibility for many individuals. The three woredas comprise of 13% of the total population of South Wollo. Of the total three woredas the largest number of population 41% (151,762) is in the age category of 15-39 years old, who are eligible for labour. According to resourceful informants, the average plot of land worked per family in the three woredas is inadequate because of its low productivity. The majority of land is used for self-sufficiency, and in some areas, cash crop production for export is insignificant. Moreover, the increasing population puts further pressure on the land, making attainment of self-sufficiency more challenging. Generally speaking, shortage of cultivable land due to rapid population growth, lack of adequate rainfall and decline of the productivity of the arable farmland are among the peoples' most serious challenges. These environmental hazards create conditions of insufficient resources or income that bring about impoverished life of the local people. As a consequence of such factors and as in the rest of Ethiopia, large number of people move both internally and abroad in search of employment opportunities. According to South Wollo Labour and Employee Affairs 2015 human trafficking plan, a large number of low skilled people move aboard via three main routes: Eastward via Bati- Afar and Somalia land / Djibouti, North part via Metema, and Southern part via Kenya. Such routes confirm those recorded by national and international researches. The statistical data collected from North East Immigration Office, Dessie branch, shows that the number of people requesting a passport increases from year to year and indicates that the number of individuals from Ambassel, Tehuledere and Worebabo Woredas claiming for passport almost tripled from 2014 compared to 2016. According to data collected from the study area at Qebele level transnational illegal emigrants from the 3 woredas passed from a total of 2940 units (1118 M, 1822 F) in 2013/2014, to 2673 (1099 M, 1574 F) in 2014/2015, to 3282 units in 2015/2016 (1136 M, 2146 F) out of a total population of 94731 population above 15 years old. In terms of sex and preferred route, the majority of female were travelling by air while most of the male travelers preferred to travel across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Regarding legal migration, according to the data of the archive department of Dessie Branch Immigration Office, licensed travelers (mainly in the form of tourist visa) increased from 1329 units

in 2014/2015 to 4072 units in 2015/2016, but there is disparity with data from the three Woredas' Migration Offices.

Main drivers with data on the relative importance of the different structural variables

The research collected interviews from returnees, families of emigrants and community leaders about the main drivers for migration the sample consisting of 160 people. The majority returnee respondents (96%) agreed an "impoverished life" as a push determinate factor for illegal out migration. Besides this, 83% of them considered lack of job opportunity as a cause for movement of people broad. When we come to see the pull factors, observing successful returnees and initiation of traffickers are believed to be the contributory causes. With regard to re-enforcers, 73% of the respondents support migrants' low attitude to local work being reinforce for migration, which is followed by the country's loose migration protection law. Migrants' low attitude to local work would mean that "potential emigrants" (those who choose to move not because of a direct threat of persecution or death, but mainly to improve their lives by finding work) intention of giving least value for different occupations in their localities as compared to the work they expect to do and the hope that they earn from the destination countries. Their attitude towards local work is inferior to making money in host country. 110 (85%) emigrant families and 101 (80%) community leaders agreed that determinants for illegal out migration to the Arab world is both poverty and unemployment. The focus group discussion conducted with leaders of Edir association (Qere), elder people (shimaglles), deported emigrants, Qabele office managers and emigrant families, agreed to the answers of the above respondents. Their justification for their conclusions are individual land fragmentation ownership and some individuals become landless due to rapid population growth in their respected localities, poverty and food shortages, rural indebtedness and inability to return debt as well as absence of job opportunity for those who graduated from different levels of educational institutions. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that economic hardship and a lack of available job opportunities are the main determinant factors exposing large numbers of inhabitants to illegal out migration in the three Woredas. Successful emigrants in the host country exacerbate individual problems. Thus, individuals rush crossing the border for better life. The following analysis exhibits the relationship between push and pull factors and illegal out migration as below.

The migrant's journey and the risks of irregular migration

Both written and oral sources agree that emigrants use three travel routes to go to their destination countries from Ethiopia. According to the research, the majority of returnees (54%), emigrant families (69%) and community leaders (67%) stated that most of the illegal out migration is strongly associated with the role of brokers across the sea. Key informants and participants of focus group discussion have supported the reply of these respondents. The information collected from victims of illegal out travellers disclosed the existence of an overwhelming number of emigrants who follow the sea route with the help of outlawed brokers. According to experienced illegal out travellers, terminus for one way of crossing the border to Saudi Arabia include Dessie- Kombolcha - Besheftu - Hayo - Djibouti - Jeza (Yemen) to Saudi border. The other terminus Addis Ababa -Harar - Jijiga - Besseso (Somalia) -Yemen - Saudi border to different towns of Saudi Arabia in general and Jeddah in particular. The third optional way of terminals is Addis Ababa - Adama - Deshitu - Hayu (Djibouti) to the coast of Yemen by boat. After reaching the coast, they are

taken to a “fenced but unofficial and hidden concentration camp” of Yemeni brokers. This is followed by a tiresome journey on foot to the border of Saudi Arabia, who according to all respondents is the destination country for the wide majority of out migrants. Generally, the brokers can be divided into four groups. The first group covers the area between the local areas of the emigrant to the Ethio-Djibouti border. The second group is found in the area between Djibouti and the Coast; the third group consists of Yemeni brokers who directed emigrants from the coast to the Yemen-Saudi border or to the common borderline of Yemen and the smaller Gulf states. The other group of brokers are the Saudi brokers who arranged the emigrants’ way of travel from the Saudi - Yemen border to Jeddah and other areas of Saudi Arabia.

The duration of the journey is from a minimum of 18 to a maximum of 90 days. Generally, illegal travels across the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the Middle East counties dominate the route of emigrants.

One of the greatest burdens of emigrants linked with the journey is the amount of Birr paid for travel expense that according to respondents ranges from 200 to 2300 euro, in general an enormous amount of money for migrants who are poor in their living standards and forced to seek work abroad. The amount of money is paid at different terminal places along the journey, each new broker met asking the migrants to pay additional money that was not incorporated in the initial agreement. According to information collected by interviewees, the first two major sources of travel, are usury and selling of their property, where usury by rich individuals is given at a rate of 100% interest.

Risks related to the journeys refer to several dimensions. The first is associated with the families of the migrants when the emigrants decide to go: beyond the pain caused by the separation that represents high emotional costs for both the mover and those left behind, in other occasions migrants need to face the refusal of their families which results in disruption of marriage, selling and distribution of properties between partners, and serious conflicts among family members. Other risks refers to the route itself, with plundering of properties during the journey (46% of respondents who mentioned money raid, looting of glamorous ornaments, taking of watches, ravaging of cloths and other essential materials) and physical violence (36% of respondents) among main factors mentioned by respondents. Brokers torture migrants even to death (burns of parts of the body or damage of eyes as well as being beaten with sticks, electric wire, plastic rope, straps and thrust) until they give the phone number of relatives in Saudi Arabia, whom they ask additional money for continuing the journey. Other suffering comes from hunger and water thirst, bite by poisonous snakes, boat crush and sinking in the sea, lose of physical fitness, while rape is regular against women. The third area of risk is after the arrival of the emigrant in the destination country: here migrants denounce absence of right to change employer, being subject to physical violence, unbearable workload, long working hours per day, lack of freedom and denial of salary payment as common experiences of working as illegal workers in foreign countries like Saudi Arabia. Finally the fourth area of risk is when emigrants are captured and then deported to their home country: due to the attempt to live and work without having a residential permit, the lack of political stability and other related factors in the host country most of the illegal migrants are exposed to arrest and deportation. Most of the interviewed illegal out migrants (returnees) stated that returning home from the host countries was

caused by deportation, end of contract, boredom from the general hard working and living conditions, health problems, home sickness and to grab the money they earn, were deportation (66%) and end of contract (19%) were the most frequent cases.

Main impacts and effects of migration on local communities

The impacts and effects of the migration phenomenon include a variety of consequences, that range from the use of remittances, effects on religious and cultural beliefs, as well as on education, marriage and children's guardianship. Remittances sent by migrants are the most evident effect of migration, quite often positive. When families receive remittances, these are used to build quality houses, domestic animals, house furniture or vehicles; families invested money in children's education, deposited money in the bank, sometimes invested in buying a shop or a bar that serves the community or simply lived a life at a higher standard (money spent on consumption). Finally respondents agreed that remittances have concrete value only if there is a definite plan and appropriate program for its use. On the contrary, other interviewees said that most of emigrants' families found themselves in a precarious situation due to emigration of their family members: paying the money borrowed from usurers, getting an adequate salary to compensate the properties sold for the journey, releasing the rented land. This happens in case the emigrant fails to reach the destination country or in case of his/her deportation back home. Generally respondents claimed that most of the emigrants' families went bankrupt and live now in poverty as a consequence of debits undertaken to finance the journey or their relative. While discussing the extent of emigrants' contribution for the development of the Woreda, focus group respondents concluded that even if remittances are generated from the destination country, there is still no significant and long-lasting contribution of emigrants. Regarding religion and culture, migration has several effects of the life of families and communities of origin.

Once they return, it happens that migrants change their beliefs or radicalized their Islamic beliefs, pushing the other members of the family to follow strictly the rules of the religion, while they started to use Arabic words and phrases as lingua franca; sometimes non-traditional religious and cultural habits are introduced in the communities. Only 6% of interviewed migrants declared they changed their religion due to the migration experience. Regarding education the research concludes that migration has undeniable influence on the increasing number of students' dropout in the schools of the three Woredas. Confirming the available studies and researches on the effects of migration on marriage and family life, the research reports that migration caused divorce according to about 60% of returnees, 75% of family members, and 83% of community leaders. Heavy consequences are also reported about children of migrants families: both children born in migrants' families and children who were born abroad and then sent back to their origin country do not receive enough guardianship (according to 50% to 60% of respondents, while between 33% and 42% disagreed and between 6% and 20% were uncertain). An appalling phenomenon emerged from the research. It refers to children born in the destination countries: when they are between 3 and 6 months old, the babies born from Ethiopian female migrants who cannot keep them are given to the irregular women who are in prison waiting to be deported back to Ethiopia. Suffering health problems and if they survive, they are handed over to their relatives and families, passing by Addis Abeba,

by the returnee women who receive 4000 riyal, about 1000 euro. However children born in the Arab world are called “yeareb ager diqaloch” (illegitimates, or bastards of Arab countries) and socially marginalized.

“Recommendations” for institutions

Government has a responsibility to bring a paradigm shift of increasing agricultural productivity, to assist people to see opportunities, to fulfill credit and consultancy services and to creating awareness of the consequences and hazards of illegal out migration in accordance of effective use of laws for protecting illegal –out migration.

Based on the findings of the research, the following recommendations were drawn:

- Awareness should be raised among local communities and decision makers on the consequences of illegal migration on the society.
- Areas of revenue generation and opportunities should be identified and training given to potential migrants
- Access to finance, consultancy service and strategies to enhance them for work need to be facilitated
- Government needs to make efforts to protect migrants’ rights in the host countries by reaching bilateral agreements with destination countries
- Government should work bilaterally with destination countries also with the aim to facilitate legal migration and avoid illegal migration
- Government should make legal and administrative measures against human trafficking
- Government authorities and decision makers should engage themselves to fight the plight of usury, which leads migrants’ families to poverty and bankruptcy to borrow the money for the migrants’ journey.
- Returnees should be assisted both psychologically to recover from trauma and economically to come out of poverty, with training and access to credit
- Families should be empowered economically to avoid their dependency from remittances and become more financially viable
- Awareness should be raised in students against school dropout caused by migration
- Migrants’ families should be supported through ad hoc legislation and awareness raising programs also with reference to the negative consequences of migration on divorce and children guardianship



From Ethiopia to Italy: Causes and Complexity of Migration

By Adelaide Massimi and Fabrizio Coresi

Migration is a phenomenon involving a small share of the Ethiopian population: 0,74% (740.000 migrants), according to the statistics of IOM.

Nevertheless, migration is a chronic phenomenon, due to different factors: new expectations by the population due to the rapid economic transformations; expulsion from the land for social and environmental transformations. Migration fluxes from Ethiopia are following irregular, dangerous and insecure routes, and despite being a source of income for many households, as well as for the Country's economic growth, they cause abuses and human rights violations for migrants in the countries of transit and destination. Italy is hosting a limited numbers of Ethiopian citizens – 8000 residents in 2016, mostly women – and represents mainly a transit destination towards the countries of Central and Northern Europe.

Ethiopia has gained in time a major role in the regional and international politics, thanks to its political and diplomatic credibility and its economic growth. Cooperation and aid by European Governments is relevant; Italy is very active among them, including the role of the private company Salini Impreglio, active in the construction of dams and hydroelectric systems.

The States of the Horn of Africa, and Ethiopia as regional leader, have become in the years privileged counterparts of the European Union and Italy, through relevant multilateral and bilateral discussions. These discussions have mainly focused on the contrast to irregular migration, and after the initial intentions included in the Global Approach to Migration (GAM) of the European Commission (2005), they turned into a security approach.

The strategy of the EU and its Member States is clearly separating forced migration and spontaneous migration: on one side, it stresses on the need to reinforce the protection and reception policies for forced migrant, on the other hand it tries to limit the opportunities of entry for those who are considered – sometimes based only on their origin – economic migrants.

For Ethiopia it is not possible to identify a single cause for migration, and therefore to define if it's more forced or economic migration. At the same time, management of natural resources and expropriation of agricultural land is pushing farmers to look for their livelihoods abroad. Such circumstances can generate internal migration fluxes towards urban areas as well as cross-border migration. Climate change and cyclic emergencies, such as droughts and floods – combined with overexploitation of natural resources – represent additional causes of migration, which is not easy to classify among the different categories of human mobility.

Migration policies adopted by the European Union and Italy in the recent years risk to seriously limit the access to the right of international protection for persons escaping situations of conflict or persecution. To this respect, Ethiopia is hosting a large number of refugees. People flowing from neighbouring countries are crossing the Ethiopian territory to migrate to North Africa and Europe. Migrants landing in Europe through the central Mediterranean routes are coming mostly from Eritrea and Somalia.

This is a key factor to understand how the international agreements with Third Countries are responding to two main short-term objectives: control of frontiers (e.g. the agreement signed between Italy and Libya on 2 February 2017) and registration of in-transit migration, such as the cases of Ethiopia and Niger, aimed at avoiding that migrants can leave those countries to reach Europe.

In conclusion, it is mandatory that all the stakeholders involved in the management of migration fluxes from Ethiopia are taking into consideration the complex situation in terms of access to livelihoods and implement the appropriate policies to reduce poverty and migration as a consequence of it. It is advisable that migration and development policies are better integrated, moving the focus of the cooperation with the countries of origin and transit of the migrants from security and control to the opportunities that migration can offer to the countries of origin. Cooperation and aid should not be used for frontiers control purposes, but rather for co-development projects based on the respect of human rights and democratic governance.

Methodology

This research has tried to find the interrelations between the different factors determining the dimensions and dynamics of the migration fluxes, in order to investigate the root causes of migration from Ethiopia to Italy. Among the pushing factors we have identified and analyzed the following: social inequalities, climate changes, conflict around access to resources; among specific attracting factors of Italy to Ethiopia, the research has focused on: historical and political relations between the two countries; composition and structure of the diaspora, welfare system and support system to migrants and integration policies. Concerning the analysis of the dynamics of these fluxes and the different ways Ethiopian migrants enter in Italy, the research has analyzed Italian and European migration policies and their interconnections with the cooperation and development policies.

The study has taken into consideration the analysis of the publications and the statistics existing on this issue. In Italy, a qualitative research has been carried out between October 2016 and January 2017, through half-structured interviews with representatives of the Ethiopian diaspora, staff of organizations supporting migrants, experts and other relevant witnesses. In Ethiopia the field survey has resulted in 11 focus groups between December 2016 and February 2017, with the participation of the population of the different kebeles and the two woredas (Ankober and Termaber) covered by the project, and 7 half-structured interviews to the representatives of the Local Authorities.

People interviewed in Italy have answered to an half-structured questionnaire aimed at defining their social and economic situation in Ethiopia; the reasons for migration and the current situation in Italy; the routes followed when migrating.

The 8 focus groups carried out in Ethiopia in December 2016 were organized by age: a first group for 18/25 and a second for 25/55. Focus groups were organized in two phases, the first aiming at analyzing migration through an external point of view in the second aiming

at describing migration from a personal perspective.

The 4 focus groups of February 2017 saw mixed groups by age and gender, so that interaction between different generations could be observed, and possible conflict or common views on migration identified. Specific attention was paid to the use of remittances within the communities and their possible impact.

Local Authorities answered to half-structured interviews to enquire the size of the migration phenomenon, the existence of specific projects to fight irregular migration, the position of the Local Authorities towards the positive and negative impacts of migration.

In the light of what has emerged from the research it is recommended:

To the European Institutions

1. to address the phenomenon of transit for international protection seekers, in the first place by standardizing the reception systems of the Member States and ensuring a better distribution of asylum seekers among the EU Member States; to initiate a revision of the Dublin Regulation that takes into account the legitimate needs and projects of international protection on the country of residence;
2. to review the implicit address in the reform of the European asylum system aimed at the contrast of secondary movements, to the return also of potential asylum seekers, to the externalization of borders and the right of asylum on the basis of discretionary concepts such as safe country of origin, safe third country and first country of asylum.

To the Italian and European institutions

1. not to use informal agreements – such as soft law agreements, police agreements, partnership agreements, MOUs, etc - for readmission agreements, or readmission clauses, and to focus instead on the process of international agreements to ensure the necessary transparency to the process and the free expression on the issue of the civil societies of the Member States and third countries; to avoid the Compact and the financing of private firms of the Member States in third countries where it is hard to supervise their work, in the interest of the people who are in need for support by cooperation actions;
2. to monitor the use of funds for development projects and the allocation of resources and humanitarian aid; to make sure that the funds for development cooperation are based on social and environmental impact assessment that will be used for monitoring.
3. To create safe entry channels for refugees headed to the European Union and Italy; to ensure an easier and greater access to legal migration channels, through a visa policy that allows a better match between demand and supply of labor and education, and to facilitate circular migration processes contributing to the improved exchange between the countries of origin and arrival of the migrants;

4. To seek greater policy coherence on migration and development, by not using cooperation as a means of ensuring police actions along the borders of transit countries, but investing in co-development projects;; to be vigilant in police cooperation programs and border control so that such operations are conducted with the highest standards of respect for the rights of the migrants;

To the Italian Institutions

1. to strengthen the system of reception of applicants for international protection and to increase social inclusion and employment projects; not to convert into law the decree law approved by the Council of Ministers of the Italian Government on February 10 2017 - “Urgent measures for acceleration of proceedings on the issue of international protection and measures to fight illegal immigration” - without a substantial revision of the proposed amendments that goes in the direction of a restriction of the right of asylum and the right of defense;
2. to immediately stop the practice that involves taking the fingerprints of immigrants, for photos signaling purposes, through the use of force or through an illegitimate extension of administrative detention, a practice which violates the prohibition of physical or psychological violence and arbitrary detention contained in article 13 of the Italian Constitution;
3. to give emphasis to the improvement of relations between Italy and Ethiopia, and to promote mutual understanding of the social, political and economic situation of Ethiopia.

Acknowledgment

Kassegne Damtew and Gashaw Mohamed (Wollo University); Henok Yohannes, Seid Mekonen, Marcon Bashaye and Birhanu Negeri (Madda Walabu University); Henok Yohannes, Tizazu Ayalew Teka, Mesfin Abraham and Getachew Demisse (Madda Walabu University); Kelemework Tafere, Zenawi Gebremeskel, Tsehay Weldegiorgis, Awet Hailezgi and Kelil Demsis (Mekelle University); Bisrat Weldesilassie, Teklebrhan Berhe, Weldeabrha Niguse and Muuz Abrha (Adigrat University); Tekalign Diyana, Muktar Mohammed and Ahmed Mohammed (Oda Bultum University); Massimi Adelaide e Fabrizio Coresi (ActionAid); Nadia Rossetto (CIFA); Filippo Ascolani e Leonardo Puleo (CISP); Ivan White, Federico Capurro e Shawol Kidane (COOPI).